On August 7, 1987, the Central American Presidents signed a peace agreement
in Guatemala City which, if implemented, could have a significant impact in
the region.1
The agreement does not address the causes of the violence and suffering that
plague these long-term U.S. dependencies, but it might restrict U.S.
intervention, a prerequisite to any constructive change. The circumstances of
the accords should be carefully studied by those who hope to influence state
policy, but I will defer this crucial topic, keeping here to the prospects for
implementation of the accords.
In approaching this question, we must bear in mind that we live in the Age
of Orwell, in which every term has two meanings: its literal meaning, largely
irrelevant in practice, and the operative meaning, devised in the interests of
established power. Accordingly, there are two versions of the accords to
consider: the actual text, and the radically different Washington version.
We therefore face two questions: (1) Can the accords be implemented in
terms of their actual content? (2) Can they be implemented according to the
Washington version? The first of these questions is only an academic exercise,
but it is illuminating to consider it nonetheless.
The Irrelevant Facts
Keeping to the actual substance of the accords, there is no possibility
that they can be implemented, as a review of the initial three-month period
clearly demonstrates.
The accords identify one factor as "an indispensable element to achieving a
stable and lasting peace in the region," namely, termination of any form of
aid "to irregular forces or insurgent movements" on the part of "regional or
extraregional" governments. As a corollary, the Central American governments
agree to deny their territory to any such groups. This demand is directed at
the United States and the client states it has used for the attack against
Nicaragua by what contra lobbyists candidly describe in internal documents as
a "proxy force," organized, trained, supplied and controlled by the CIA.
This central feature of the accords is redundant, since such actions are
barred by a higher authority: by international law and treaty, hence by the
supreme law of the land under the U.S. Constitution, which we are enjoined to
celebrate this year. The fact was underscored by the World Court in June 1986
as it condemned the United States for its "unlawful use of force" against
Nicaragua and called upon it to desist from these crimes. Congress responded
by voting $100 million of aid and freeing the CIA to direct the attack and to
use its own funds on an unknown scale. The U.S. vetoed a UN Security Council
resolution calling on all states to observe international law and voted
against a General Assembly resolution to the same effect, joined by Israel and
El Salvador. On Nov. 12, 1987, the General Assembly again called for "full and
immediate compliance" with the World Court decision. This time only Israel
joined with the U.S. in opposing adherence to international law, another blow
to the Central American accords, unreported by the national press as usual.
The media had dismissed the World Court as a "hostile forum" whose
decisions are irrelevant, while liberal advocates of world order explained
that the U.S. must disregard the Court decision. With this reaction, U.S.
elites clearly articulate their self-image: the United States is a lawless
terrorist state, which stands above the law and is entitled to undertake
violence, as it chooses, in support of its objectives. The reaction to the
"indispensable element" of the Central America accords merely reiterated that
conviction.
To ensure that the accords would be undermined, the U.S. at once directed
its proxy forces to escalate military actions, also increasing the regular
supply flights that are required to keep them in the field. These had passed
the level of one a day in the preceding months in support of the "spring
offensive," designed to achieve sufficient levels of terror and disruption to
impress Congress. The proxy army followed Washington orders to attack "soft
targets" such as farm cooperatives and health clinics instead of "trying to
duke it out with the Sandinistas directly," as explained by General John
Galvin, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, who added that with these
tactics, aimed at civilians lacking means of defense against armed terrorist
bands, prospects for the contras should improve. The State Department
officially authorized such attacks, with the support of media doves. There are
other terrorist states, but to my knowledge, the United States is alone today
in officially endorsing international terrorism. We see here another
illustration of the self-image of U.S. elites: in a terrorist culture, all
that counts is the success of violence. Accordingly, debate in Congress and
the media focused on the question of whether the violence could succeed, with
"doves" arguing that the proxy army was inept and hawks replying that it must
be given more time and aid to prove itself as a successful terrorist force --
putting euphemisms aside.
CIA-directed supply flights into Nicaragua doubled by mid-September
according to the Los Angeles Times, while Nicaraguan sources that
have been accurate in the past, though ignored, alleged that violations of
Nicaraguan airspace rose from 70 in September to 110 in October, most of them
supply flights, particularly in areas where the government had declared a
unilateral cease-fire.2
Before the OAS, President Ortega reported 140 supply flights during the
three-month initial phase of the accords, an estimate dismissed as far too low
by contra commander Adolfo Calero, who said that "his radar is not working
very well."3
A review of the major media reveals only a few phrases alluding to these
matters,4
a highly illuminating fact. Of these few references, some reveal editorial
adjustments in a further service to state violence; thus the New York
Times, which suppressed this crucial issue throughout the three-month
period, did cite the statements by Ortega and Calero on Nov. 12, but where
they each spoke of supply flights, the Times news report
downgraded the reference to "surveillance flights," still a violation of
international law and the agreements, but a much less serious one, and thus
less unacceptable in the newspaper of record.5
"Western military analysts say the contras have been stashing tons of newly
airdropped weapons lately while trying to avoid heavy combat," the Los
Angeles Times reported in October. "Meanwhile, they have stepped up
attacks on easy government targets like the La Patriota farm
cooperative...where several militiamen, an elderly woman and her year-old
grandson died in a pre-dawn shelling."6
To select virtually at random from the many cases deemed unworthy of notice,
on Nov. 21, 150 contras attacked two villages in the southern province of Rio
San Juan with 88mm mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, killing six children
and six adults and injuring 30 others, wire services reported, citing
Nicaraguan radio. Even cooperatives of religious pacifists who refuse to bear
arms are destroyed by the U.S. terrorist forces.7
In a November report on human rights abuses in Nicaragua, barely noted in the
42nd paragraph of a report on contra successes in the New York Times,
Americas Watch described the contras as an "outlaw force" whose continuing
abuse of human rights means that "we see no way for compliance with the Arias
plan's requirement for respect for human rights other than the dissolution of
the contras and an end to all aid for them by the United States, Honduras and
all others" -- the "indispensable element" for peace and an obligation under
the irrelevant rule of law.8
The U.S. also launched further war games in Honduras, Operation "Blazing
Trail 1987," barely noted in the media. Nicaragua's protest described them as
the "biggest-ever military maneuvers in Honduran territory," adding that "we
can't see this in any way as a contribution to peace" -- something of an
understatement.9
Shortly after the accords were signed, the CIA offered $3000-a-month bribes
to 14 Miskito Indian leaders to induce them to maintain the military conflict.
The spokesman for the Indian opposition described this as "a last-ditch U.S.
attempt to undercut their plan to pursue a negotiated settlement with the
Sandinistas," UPI reported, adding that U.S. intelligence officials "have
stressed what they call the strategic importance of retaining Indian
participation in the war to help gain international support," the usual
cynical exploitation of indigenous peoples. U.S. government officials quoted
in the Mexican press report that the CIA salaries come from a secret account
"for political projects," unrelated to the $100 million in congressional
funding.10
The going rate is considerably higher for the wealthy businessmen who serve as
CIA democrats-for-hire, for example, Alfonso Robelo, who receives $10,000
monthly tax-free, or Arturo Cruz, whose secret $7000-a-month subsidy was
transferred from the CIA to Oliver North's account for fear that Congress
would expose his illegal lobbying and the fraud he perpetrated as a paid U.S.
agent in connection with the campaign to disrupt the unwanted Nicaraguan
elections of 1984 -- elections that did not take place according to the media,
which regularly contrast the "elected presidents" of the U.S. client states
with the Nicaraguan dictator Ortega, who was not "elected" according to
official doctrine.
Undersecretary of State Elliott Abrams conducted a news conference by radio
in the Central American capitals on Oct. 22, unreported in the national press,
at which he announced that the United States will "never accept a Soviet
satellite in Central America" -- meaning a country that is not a loyal U.S.
satellite -- and that "We're going to continue the aid to the resistance," to
be sure, in violation of the "indispensable element" for peace. The Reagan
administration announced its intention to seek congressional backing for its
war, and Congress obliged by providing "humanitarian" aid -- meaning, any form
of aid that the government chooses to send -- in direct violation of the
accords. Secretary of State George Shultz informed the OAS that the U.S. would
persist in the unlawful use of force by its "resistance fighters" until a
"free Nicaragua" is established by Washington standards, thus consigning the
accords to oblivion, along with international law. This announcement was noted
in a 140-word item in the Times stressing Washington's intent to
give the accords "every chance," while a headline in the liberal Boston
Globe reported approvingly that the U.S. is "easing stance."11
While the media and Congress took note of Washington's plans for the
future, the actual steps taken to undermine the central elements of the peace
agreements passed in virtual silence, in accord with the principle that the
United States is entitled to employ violence as it chooses. The same basic
principle explains the elite consensus, including the most outspoken doves,
that Nicaragua must not be permitted to obtain aircraft to defend its
territory. The pretense of liberal Congressmen and others that such aircraft
would be a threat to the United States may be dismissed with no comment. The
real intent is obvious: the terrorist superpower must be free to penetrate
Nicaraguan airspace at will for surveillance and coordination of the attacks
on "soft targets" by its proxy forces, and to provide them with arms and
supplies.
These crucial facts suffice to demonstrate that in terms of their
irrelevant substance, the accords were dead before the ink was dry, with the
full support of congressional liberals and elite opinion generally.
Note that as tacitly conceded on all sides, the proxy forces bear no
resemblance to guerrillas. Rather, they are, by the standards of the region, a
well-equipped mercenary army maintained by overwhelming U.S. power; their
supporters insist that they would collapse if this unlawful aid and control
were to be withdrawn. The contrast to authentic guerrillas, as in El Salvador,
is dramatic, but suppressed, in the interest of maintaining the Washington
fiction of a "symmetry" between Nicaragua and El Salvador. There is indeed a
symmetry, though not the one put forth by Washington and its Free Press. In
both countries, there is a terrorist army attacking "soft targets" and
slaughtering civilians, and in both countries, it is organized and maintained
by the United States: the army of El Salvador, and the proxy army attacking
Nicaragua from foreign bases. The symmetry reaches to fine details. In El
Salvador too, the U.S. mercenary forces attack cooperatives, killing, raping
and abducting members, as Americas Watch has reported.12
Let us turn now to a secondary matter, the response of the countries of the
region. Honduras announced at once that it would not observe the accords. The
government refused to concede the existence of contra camps within the
country, and announced that no verification would be permitted until Nicaragua
satisfies Washington of its compliance, by whatever standards the terrorist
superpower chooses to impose. Honduras refused to form even a token National
Commission of Reconciliation. After domestic protest, it finally did so two
days before the deadline, on November 3, but, as President Azcona explained,
the Commission "will not do anything" and will only serve to "fulfill a
requirement."13
Hence with regard to internal problems too, the accords are dead as far as
Honduras is concerned.
The accords call for establishment of "justice, freedom and democracy" in
the states of the region, and these are serious problems in Honduras. The
country is under effective military rule behind a thin civilian facade, and as
the U.S. moved to convert it into a military base in the 1980s, human rights
violations substantially increased. Hundreds of thousands of peasants are
starving to death in the south while the country exports food. Thousands have
been forcefully expelled by the contras from the areas where the government
denies their existence. The head of the Christian Democratic Party reports
that "there is institutional torture, there are more than 150 disappeared
people, there are assassinations and exiles, and capital punishment is legal,
as can be seen by assassinations carried out by the state." Thousands of
peasants, unemployed people, and common criminals have been imprisoned for
years without trial. Much of the state terror is traceable to a CIA-trained
elite battalion, a standard pattern. The leader of a peasant organization, one
of 14 suspected "subversives" arrested by the police in October, stated that
he was tortured to force him to confess links to guerrillas. Police and
soldiers arrested, tortured and killed students and peasants in a series of
October actions. Ramon Custodio, president of the Commission for the Defense
of Human Rights in Central America and of the Honduran Human Rights
Commission, stated in late October that killings by the security forces are
becoming "more blatant," citing the murder of a trade union leader, unarmed
young men, and 30 criminals, and adding that "political prisoners are not
given the chance to be taken alive." As the first three-month phase of the
accords ended, he stated at an international press conference (reported in the
Mexican press) that the human rights situation had become worse in Honduras
since 1985: "Before there was talk of disappearances and torture; now they
simply kill...." including army deserters, who are killed when captured. He
added that the human rights situations "have deteriorated" in Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras since the accords were signed, so that "the little hope
there is that human rights will improve in the region is steadily decreasing."14
Such continuing atrocities, and the refusal of the government to undertake
the steps required by the accords, pass without comment in the Free Press,
which also fails to note that the accords stress the need to overcome
"profound divisions" within each society and that the mechanisms proposed are
aimed at establishing "justice" as well as meaningful democracy, not
merely empty forms designed to ensure the funding of repression by a compliant
Congress that pretends not to see.
In the terror states, Guatemala and El Salvador, the question of compliance
with the accords can scarcely be raised, and no one is raising it. Consider
freedom of the press. We hear a great deal about La Prensa,
including many fabrications, for example, that this is the journal that
courageously opposed Somoza; in fact, when the owners made clear their
commitment to the old order of privilege and exploitation, the editor left
with 80% of the staff to form El Nuevo Diario, which can fairly
claim to be the successor to La Prensa, if a newspaper is defined
in terms of its editor and staff, not its owners and plant. La Prensa
was suspended by the government the day after the U.S. effectively declared
war on Nicaragua, in the terms used by elated Reagan administration officials
as the Democrat-controlled House passed the contra aid bill. La Prensa
was funded by the terrorist superpower attacking Nicaragua, and the journal
supported this attack. The fact that it had been allowed to publish at all has
few if any precedents. Now it is publishing again, still supporting the war
against Nicaragua while the superpower conducting the war provides it with
"essential" funding according to its director, contra supporter Jaime
Chamorro; again, an unprecedented phenomenon. We should also bear in mind the
unreported fact that in much of Nicaragua, radio and television are dominated
by the United States and its client states, demonizing the Sandinistas in the
manner that has been so effective at home and inducing people in areas where
this is the prime "information" source to "dread the Sandinistas as if they
were the devil incarnate," as Joe Eldridge reports in a study of Nicaraguan
refugees in Honduras.15
One should not underestimate the means available to a terrorist superpower
that operates with few domestic constraints.
Let us turn now to freedom of the press in Washington's terror states. In
El Salvador there was once an independent press: La Cronica and
El Independiente. They were not funded by a superpower attacking
El Salvador, and they were not censored. Rather, one paper was closed when
army tanks surrounded its offices after a series of attacks including the
machine-gunning of a 14-year-old newsboy and bombing and assassination
attempts that drove the editor out of the country; the other was closed when
the security forces seized the editor and an associate, disembowelled them
with machetes, and shot them. Is anyone calling for the reopening of La
Cronica and El Independiente? Of course not, for two good
and sufficient reasons: (1) Washington has commanded us to focus on La
Prensa and Nicaragua, where nothing remotely comparable has happened,
and being loyal cowards, we naturally obey; (2) the idea of opening an
independent press in El Salvador is absurd. It would be necessary to send in
an international army to deter the U.S.-run security forces and prevent the
murder of the staff, if such media ever approached the condition that
according to U.S. law justifies state control over speech: that is, if they
posed a "clear and present danger," namely, to the system of privilege
maintained by U.S. violence.
Accordingly, we do not speak of freedom of press in El Salvador. Or in
Guatemala, where there has also been no censorship, and no reporting of such
trivialities as the slaughter of tens of thousands of people in the past
decade. The reason for the oversight is that some 50 journalists were murdered
by the security forces, some in spectacular fashion. There is therefore no
need for censorship, which we abhor.
Meanwhile U.S. government propaganda relayed by the media as "news" assures
us that Duarte "gave the rebels free access to the press" (New York
Times Central America correspondent James LeMoyne)16;
technically true, since no law bars such access, only the workings of the
market supplemented by state terror.
The real attitudes of U.S. elites towards freedom of the press are revealed
further by the response to events elsewhere during the same period. In the
Philippines, the government closed three radio stations and threatened others
on October 7, accusing them of "glorifying the enemies of the Government and
openly defying the Government of President Aquino by continuously transmitting
the propaganda of right-wing rebel groups and other enemies of the state."
This "crackdown on the media" was reported, but without comment, along with
the outlawing of the opposition (Communist) party that had been legalized by
the Marcos dictatorship, police raids against "suspected communists," and
government authorization of vigilante groups -- that is, death squads.17
There were no calls for organizing a "democratic resistance" to overthrow this
"totalitarian" state, though they would be heard quickly enough if Aquino were
to undertake measures of social reform and democratization that would threaten
the interests of U.S. corporations or the U.S. bases.
The major U.S. client state, which is endlessly lauded as a stellar
democracy, provides even more dramatic insight into the real principles that
animate those who courageously condemn Nicaraguan "totalitarianism." Shortly
after La Prensa was suspended, Israel permanently closed two
Jerusalem newspapers on the grounds that "although we offer them freedom of
expression...it is forbidden to permit them to exploit this freedom in order
to harm the State of Israel." The closure was upheld by the High Court on the
grounds that "It is inconceivable that the State of Israel should allow
terrorist organizations which seek to destroy it to set up businesses in its
territory, legitimate as they may be"; the government had accused these two
Arab newspapers of receiving support from hostile groups. To my knowledge, the
only mention of these facts in a daily newspaper was in a letter of mine in
the Boston Globe. As La Prensa was reopened, Israel
closed a Nazareth political journal, alleging that it supports the PLO, and
shut down an Arab-owned news office in Nablus on a similar charge, all "legal"
under the state of emergency that has been in force since 1948.18
None of this was reported here; New York Times correspondent
Thomas Friedman chose the day of the closing of the Nablus office to produce
one of his regular odes to freedom of expression in Israel.19
Similarly, the destruction of the independent press in El Salvador never
merited an editorial comment in the Times, along with numerous
other atrocities, even the assassination of the Archbishop with the apparent
complicity of the security forces.
The libertarian passions of U.S. elites are very precisely focused, much as
in the case of other commissars, who condemn abuses in U.S. domains while
lauding the progress towards freedom in the "peoples' democracies."
In other respects as well, the terror states cannot comply with the accords
as long as the U.S.-backed security forces remain in command, tolerating the
civilian facade as long as it can extort money from the U.S. Congress, much of
it a bribe to the wealthy that flows back to U.S. banks. Consider the National
Commissions of Reconciliation called for by the accords. In Nicaragua, the
Commission, formed in August, is headed by Cardinal Obando, the most vocal and
prominent critic of the regime. In El Salvador it is headed by Alvaro Maga?a
[accented character did not scan -- JBE.], the conservative banker who was the
U.S. candidate for president in 1982, therefore president, and was virtually
limited to the right wing. This does not even approach the level of black
humor, which is perhaps why it is passed over in silence, just as the outright
refusal of Honduras to appoint even a farcical Commission was not reported in
the New York Times for 5 weeks, and its subsequent fate, barely
noted.20
In Guatemala, the Archbishop, an outspoken defender of human rights, was not
even nominated by the Church, no doubt by prearrangement with the military-run
government.
In both of the terror states, the security forces maintain obedience by
violence. According to the Church human rights office Tutela Legal, in El
Salvador "death squad killings jumped from an average of four to five per
month during the first part of this year to around 10 per month in September
and October," higher still in November.21
Chris Norton, the only U.S. journalist reporting regularly from El Salvador,
observes (abroad) that the real numbers are unknown because most death squad
killings "have taken place in rural areas and few of them have been reported."
Amadeo Ramos, one of the founders of the Indian Association ANIS, reports that
an Indian settlement was bombed by the army and "the bodies of several Indians
were found in a remote area thrown in a ditch" in mid-November.22
To mention a few cases in San Salvador itself, two activists of the Mothers of
the Disappeared (CoMadres) were abducted by Treasury police on September 3,
two days after the head of the University of El Salvador Employees Union was
kidnapped by heavily armed men. In another case, which was actually reported
here, the president of the Human Rights Commission, Herbert Anaya, was
murdered while taking his children to school. A former president, Marianela
Garcia Villas, had been killed by security forces on the pretext that she was
a guerrilla, and other members had been murdered or "disappeared" by the
security forces. Anaya had been arrested and tortured by the Treasury police
in May 1986, along with other Commission members. While in prison, they
continued their work, compiling a 160-page report of testimony of over 430
political prisoners, who gave details of their torture, in one case,
electrical torture by a North American major in uniform. This report, one of
the most explicit and comprehensive in existence for any country, was smuggled
out of the prison, along with a videotape of testimony, and distributed to the
U.S. media, which had no interest in material so lacking in ideological
serviceability. After Anaya was released in a prisoner exchange, he was
repeatedly denounced by the government and threatened, also informed that he
headed a list of Commission workers to be killed. Lacking the protection that
might have been afforded by some media visibility here, he was killed,
probably by death squads associated with the security forces, as indicated by
Archbishop Rivera y Damas in an unreported statement.23
As in the past, labor activists are a primary target. In violation of
congressional legislation, the U.S. Trade Representative rejected an Americas
Watch petition to review El Salvador "solely on the grounds that it is
appropriate for the Salvadoran armed forces to arrest, interrogate, and
imprison trade unionists whom the Department of State considers to be
opponents of the Duarte Government" (Americas Watch). The petition cited
numerous examples of state terror directed against the labor movement, a
matter of no interest here. As in the case of freedom of press, concern over
labor rights is precisely focused among U.S. elites: Poland and Nicaragua, but
not the client states such as El Salvador and Israel, where the "socialist"
trade union is in the forefront of the denial of minimal rights to the
Palestinian workers who provide cheap labor under abysmal conditions.24
The severe violations of the accords by Duarte's security forces and the
lethal network associated with them pass with little comment in a terrorist
culture, where the Free Press assures us that President Duarte "has gone
considerably further [than the Sandinistas] in carrying out the letter of the
treaty" though perhaps he too is not "particularly committed to its spirit of
reconciliation," since he "is trying to split the leftist rebel alliance" --
nothing more (James LeMoyne).25
The official story throughout has been that Duarte represents the "moderate
center," unable to control the "violence by both ultrarightists and by the
Marxist guerrillas" (James LeMoyne)26;
an accompanying photo shows New York Mayor Koch being greeted by the Defense
Minister, General Vides Casanova, who presided over the slaughter of some
60,000 people, in accord with his doctrine that "the armed forces are prepared
to kill 200,000-300,000, if that's what it takes to stop a Communist
takeover." In the irrelevant world of fact, as the Times has
occasionally conceded in the small print, the violence has overwhelmingly been
traceable to the security forces. A Times editorial noted the
Anaya assassination -- as a proof of Duarte's "courage" in "defying" the death
squads for which he has long served as a fig leaf. This reaction demonstrates
that there are no limits to tolerance of virtuous atrocities. Buried in a news
story, the same day, is the fact that the killers were using sophisticated
weapons available only to the "right-wing death squads" -- that is, the
assassination squads of Duarte's security forces, as Times
editors and correspondents know, but will not say.27
Meanwhile President Duarte, in his usual manner, blamed the left for the
assassination, just as he has regularly blamed the victims for their torture
and murder by the security forces that he praises for their "valiant
services," from the moment that he took over the role of "bag man" for the
military, in the appropriate phrase of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs --
or as the media prefer, the role of "centrist-leftist" (James LeMoyne),28
valiantly crusading for democracy and social justice.
Expressing its utter contempt for the Guatemala accords, the Duarte
government passed an amnesty lauded by the New York Times as its
"most concrete step toward complying with the regional peace accord" since
Duarte has now "released almost all political prisoners," a step contrasted
with the refusal of the Sandinistas to comply apart from "tentative" and
grudging steps.29
The amnesty, bitterly opposed by human rights groups, labor and the church,
eliminated the remote possibility of any punishment for the murderers and
torturers who conducted the terror that demolished the popular organizations,
destroyed the independent media, wiped out the political opposition, killed
thousands of union activists, and effectively traumatized the population in
the U.S. crusade to eliminate the threat of democracy and social reform. In
Canada's leading journal, it is described as "an amnesty for the military and
the death squads" in an article headlined "Duarte ceasefire designed to fail,
diplomats say"30;
in Canada the Party Line is more difficult to enforce. As for the incidental
release of hundreds of political prisoners, the chief of staff of Costa Rica's
Foreign Ministry, Luis Solis, observed that the amnesty would put them at the
mercy of the death squads, who are "probably hiring people to go out and shoot
at the ones who are going to be released," quite secure that they will be
protected for their crimes. The Washington Post notes in passing
that "90 percent of the approximately 1,000 political prisoners in El Salvador
had been in custody for more than four years without a trial," and that many
fear their release to the mercy of the death squads.31
The Guatemalan military had declared a similar amnesty, for themselves, as
they permitted a civilian government to operate under their control so as to
obtain U.S. funds to rescue the country from the economic chaos they had
created while conducting mass slaughter with enthusiastic U.S. support.
Meanwhile moralists here ponder the dilemmas of the "moderate center"
concocted for their benefit by the State Department Office of Public
Diplomacy, which has the task of controlling what high Reagan administration
officials describe as "enemy territory," that is, the domestic population.
To appreciate just how extreme was the Salvadoran gesture of contempt for
the accords, we can return to the irrelevant facts. The accords call for
amnesty decrees "setting out all the steps to guarantee the inviolability of
all forms of life and liberty, material goods and the safety of the people to
benefit from said decrees" -- exactly what is declared unthinkable by the
Duarte government as it declares amnesty for the killers and torturers to the
admiring applause of the Free Press.
While in the United States, Duarte is lauded for courageously leading El
Salvador to "democracy," the reaction at home is different. Public opinion
polls conducted by the Central America University in El Salvador in early 1987
reveal that half the population "think that nothing has changed" under Duarte,
18% think that the situation has deteriorated, and a rousing 10% agree with
the U.S. media that "there is a process of democracy and freedom in the
country at present." On a visit to Holland in October 1987, Duarte was
criticized for human rights abuses while officials privately expressed
unhappiness about the visit, taken at his initiative.32
In Latin America, the reaction is harsher. On a trip to Uruguay, Argentina and
Brazil, Duarte was bitterly denounced by Christian Democratic leaders and
others and refused permission to address the General Assembly in Uruguay,
while in Argentina half the delegates left the chamber as he spoke and in
Brazil, fewer than 10% of the members attended and he was greeted with angry
demonstrations and accusations of being a genocidal murderer. In the Free
Press, one will find little mention of how our hero is perceived in countries
that have had some experience with U.S.-backed killers.
In the second of the terror states, the situation is hardly different.
Americas Watch reports 25 new "disappearances" and kidnappings in August 1987,
in addition to 74 killings reported in the press, an unknown number being
political assassinations. The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, based in
Mexico for obvious reasons, reported 572 extrajudicial executions and 142
"disappearances" from mid-January to March 1987. Other sources estimate about
50 political assassinations a month in 1987. Nineth de Garcia, Guatemala's
leading human rights activist, reported in late November, for the benefit of
the Canadian reader, that "the level of political kidnapping and murder is on
the increase" since the accords were signed.33
As in El Salvador and Honduras, the poor are press-ganged into military
service while the rich are exempt, and general poverty and misery mount while
the wealthy enjoy the benefits of efficient state terror. In all three
countries, the military remain firmly in command, serving the interests of
U.S. investors, the local oligarchy, and in El Salvador, the new elites who
are riding Duarte's coattails for their share in corruption and robbery. In
short, "democracy," American-style.
The rule of the military in the U.S.-backed terror states is illustrated by
their complete immunity from prosecution for crimes that merit comparison to
Pol Pot. All of this is acceptable, even described as "democracy," in the
terrorist superpower that has directed and supported the necessary purge of
the societies. Honduras differs primarily in that the repression has been less
bloody, or to be more accurate, more indirect: starvation and slow, cruel
death rather than torture, rape, murder and mutilation. I put aside Costa
Rica, also now dependent on U.S. aid for survival, though a serious inquiry
into the provisions of the accord for "justice, freedom and democracy" and
access by "all ideological groups" to the media (a virtual monopoly of the
ultra-right) would reveal that their terms are far from realized here, despite
much sanctimonious rhetoric.
The conclusion, then, is that in the U.S. client states of Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, there is no possibility that the accords will be
implemented. The Guatemalan Central America Report observes that
"of the five Central American countries, the Nicaraguans have by far done the
most to meet the requirements of the Guatemala Plan, and in some cases have
made conciliatory gestures not indicated in the plan," citing examples.34
Here, no one discusses the matter, because all of this is off the agenda
according to Washington orders, along with the even more serious U.S. actions
to undermine the accords. From the first days after the accords were signed,
the media assured us that whatever may appear in the irrelevant text, "there
is no doubt that [the treaty's] main provisions are principally directed at
Nicaragua and will affect Nicaragua more than any of the other nations that
signed the accord" -- which is certainly true, under the conditions of
obedience dictated by Washington, though this was presumably not the point
intended by James LeMoyne. As he explained further, the Sandinistas are "in a
somewhat exposed position" because they, and they alone, "are under close
scrutiny for their efforts to carry out the Central American peace treaty" --
as dictated by Washington, whose orders are naturally binding.35
Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer informed us that the peace
accord "requires Nicaragua to permit full press and political freedom" while
requiring "other countries in the region to stop supporting" the contras; a
half-truth that amounts to a lie, since the accord also requires the other
states to permit full press and political freedom, which is inconceivable as
long as the security forces are not dismantled and the U.S. remains in
command.
I do not mean to suggest that Kinzer is incapable of outright falsehoods,
for example, his statement in the same column that the Nicaraguan government
refused to allow the "Roman Catholic radio station to broadcast news." This is
one of his favorite tales, repeated in several other columns and by LeMoyne as
well,36
along with the claim that the Ministry of Interior refused to comment on the
matter (Oct. 20). AP reported the same day the statement of the Interior
Ministry that "Radio Catolica may broadcast news, but must apply for the
legally required permission for the program and register the name of its
director, the broadcast time and other information" -- not exactly a decisive
proof that this is a totalitarian dungeon.
These and other commentators surely understand that even if Nicaragua is
willing to overlook the fact that by orders from Washington, the terms of the
accord are inapplicable to the U.S. client states, as of course to itself,
still Nicaragua can hardly relax its guard as long as the U.S. persists in its
outspoken commitment to overthrow the government by violence. Perhaps it is
for this reason that the Times does not report such matters as
CIA-run supply flights to the proxy army, the attempts to bribe Miskito Indian
leaders, or Operation "Blazing Trail 1987" and other U.S. measures to ensure
that Nicaragua will be compelled to maintain a state of permanent mobilization
against the threat of outright U.S. invasion. In the West, threatening
military maneuvers are regarded as tantamount to aggression, justifying a
pre-emptive strike in response. Thus when Arab armies deployed in May 1967,
the Israeli attack in response was considered quite legitimate: how can Israel
be expected to sustain a mobilization for more than a few days? Israel was not
an impoverished country under attack by a terrorist superpower, but when the
U.S. carries out regular military maneuvers on Nicaragua's borders along with
overflights, naval operations nearby, even the deployment of 50,000 troops
designed to draw the army away from population defense so as to facilitate the
attack against "soft targets" by U.S.-run terrorists, there is not a word of
protest in elite circles -- apart from protest over Nicaragua's unconscionable
attempt to arm itself in self-defense. These facts too provide us with some
insight into our political culture.
Let us put aside any further discussion of the irrelevant facts and turn to
the world of illusion constructed by Washington. That is, we now turn to the
Orwellian version of the accords -- the operative version, given the realities
of power.
The Operative Illusions
According to the U.S. version, the sole question is whether the accords
will be implemented by Nicaragua -- according to the standards set by
Washington. These standards were readily predictable from the start. Since
Washington is determined to undermine the agreements, any respect in which
Nicaragua adheres to them is off the agenda. We are permitted to discuss some
element of the accords only if Washington's interpretation differs from
Nicaragua's, so that Nicaragua is in violation -- by definition. The task of
the media, then, is to conduct a parody of the sciences. In the sciences, one
confronts some puzzling facts and attempts to devise principles that will
explain them. In ideological warfare, one begins with Higher Truths dictated
from above. The task is to select the facts, or to invent them, in such a way
as to render the required conclusions not too transparently absurd -- at least
for properly disciplined minds.
Accordingly the media, and respectable opinion generally, quickly reduced
the Central American agreements to "two key points," as Stephen Kinzer
explained: (1) Will Nicaragua agree to negotiate with the contras -- that is,
with the civilian directorate established by the CIA as a classic
Communist-style front? (2) Will Nicaragua offer an amnesty to what are called
"political prisoners," including National Guardsmen arrested -- but not
killed, as is the norm elsewhere under such circumstances -- after they had
taken part in the slaughter of some 40,000 people?
The accords say nothing about these matters, but that is further irrelevant
fact. Specifically, the accords do not call for discussions with CIA-created
front organizations. That the contra directorate is exactly that has long been
known, and has recently been documented in detail in a monograph by Edgar
Chamorro, who was selected by the CIA to serve as spokesman for the front
created as part of the disinformation campaign designed by the State
Department for "enemy territory" at home (Packaging the Contras,
Institute for Media Analysis). Robert Owen, Oliver North's liaison with the
contras, described the civilian front as "a name only," "a creation of the
United States government (USG) to garner support from Congress"; power lies in
the hands of the Somozist-run FDN headed by Adolfo Calero, who "is a creation
of the USG and so he is the horse we chose to ride," though he is surrounded
by people who are "liars and greed- and power-motivated" for whom the war is
"a business" as they hope for the marines to restore them to the power they
lost.37
Washington, with the docile media in tow, focuses on the issue of negotiations
with its creation as part of the effort to establish the fiction that the
proxy army is an indigenous guerrilla force, comparable to the guerrillas in
El Salvador who were driven to the hills by U.S.-backed state terror, have
always fought within their country, receive little if any military aid from
abroad, have nothing like the extraordinary intelligence and support system
provided by the terrorist superpower, and face a military force far more
powerful than the army of Nicaragua. Notice further that negotiation of a
cease-fire with authentic guerrilla forces is hardly likely to succeed, as the
show negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala illustrate, and in the case of
Washington's proxies, the U.S. can readily disrupt any progress. The issue,
then, is marginal, as compared with such crucial matters as Washington's
unlawful use of force and state terror in the client states. But naturally
Washington will seek to restrict attention to this issue, and commentary here
has obeyed, including the doves.
As for amnesty, as we have seen, El Salvador acted at once to violate this
directive in the most blatant fashion, as Guatemala had already done when the
military declared amnesty for itself. Nicaragua had an amnesty decree that
approximates the stated conditions of the accord, apart from the state of
siege, which Nicaragua has announced will remain in force until the U.S. war
is brought to a halt, a position that we would accept as legitimate in the
case of any client state, or the United States itself if it were under attack
or threat. It was also accepted as legitimate by the Verification Commission
made up of the foreign ministers of 13 Latin American nations including the
five Central American countries. In their November 8 report, they agreed that
Nicaragua's amnesty may legitimately remain conditional on termination of aid
to the contras and use of foreign territory to attack Nicaragua. A senior
Latin American diplomat commented: "Nicaragua does not have to implement
amnesty until Honduras kicks out the contras and the Americans stop helping
them." Rephrasing the facts in official Times Newspeak: under the
provisions of the accords, "no country in the region would be permitted to
assist the contras once the Sandinistas establish full political freedom"
(Stephen Kinzer).38
The accords charge the Verification Commission with the responsibility "to
verify and monitor the commitments contained in this document." But this is
unacceptable to Washington, because the Commission is less subject to U.S.
influence than the Central American client states, who therefore must be
assigned the role of monitors. For the same reason, a Contadora agreement was
completely unacceptable to Washington, whereas a Central American agreement
could barely be tolerated. The more fanatic contra lobbyists go so far as to
inform us that the devious Ortega "tipped his hand" at the OAS when he said
that "it is up to the International Verification and Monitoring
Commission...to determine who is complying with the Guatemala accords,"
exactly as the text says, instead of the Central American presidents, as
Washington would prefer given its power over them (Robert Leiken); note how
brazenly Ortega defies Washington orders. More subtle apologists report that
"the decision" over "the accord's fate" lies in the hands of "the two
superpowers" and their respective clients, thus adopting the framework of cold
war confrontation demanded by Washington (James LeMoyne).39
The Nicaraguan amnesty was extended after the accords, including about 1000
prisoners, but few National Guardsmen. The press, following Washington
directives, speaks of eight to ten thousand "political prisoners," but
Americas Watch, in a detailed review, demonstrates that the figures are
largely fabricated, and that these are not "political prisoners" in the sense
used in the West; its February 1987 report lists two political
prisoners in this sense, one since released. Reviewing the records of the Red
Cross, Amnesty International, and its own investigations, Americas Watch
estimated that apart from common criminals (including 600 members of the army
and police sentenced for crimes against the population, a possibility
unimaginable in the terror states), the prisons contained about 2200 National
Guardsmen and 1500 people charged with security-related crimes. The report is
worth reading for its critical assessment of these matters, but that is the
real world, not the Orwellian world of Washington and its minions.
In the latter world, along with numerous other fantasies, Robert Leiken
states that "figures on Nicaraguan political prisoners...range from a low of
4,300 (Americas Watch and the Nicaraguan government)" to the much higher
claims that he has relayed.40
Putting aside the interesting reading of the Americas Watch report, note the
none-too-subtle juxtaposition of Americas Watch and the Nicaraguan government,
in obedience to Washington's longstanding attempts to undermine authentic
human rights organizations.
The New York Times review of the progress of the accords after
the "historic deadline" of November 741
conforms precisely to the dictates of the Office of Public Diplomacy. In the
survey article of November 8 by James LeMoyne, the behavior of the United
States is unmentioned and nothing is said about its client states. The article
focuses on one issue: the Sandinista decision to enter negotiations with the
CIA civilian front, with Cardinal Obando -- their most prominent antagonist --
as intermediary; a remarkable choice, since only a neutral party is considered
an appropriate "intermediary" apart from the Orwellian world established by
reigning power, and a hazardous move, since Obando can be expected to blame
the Sandinistas if the negotations collapse, as elsewhere. This decision,
LeMoyne explains, is a great victory for the United States, because its
creation thus gains the status of "a legitimate belligerent force." The
implication, drawn explicitly by administration officials the same day, is
that "we've learned from this...that pressure works, and that we must keep
that pressure on."42
The truth of the matter is that pressure works to keep the media in line,
though this victory is only a shade less difficult than the glorious conquest
of Grenada.
Accompanying LeMoyne's agitprop is a photograph of a rally in Managua with
this caption: "Nicaraguans cheering President Daniel Ortega Saavedra as he
announced that his Sandinista Government would agree to indirect negotiations
with the contras on a cease-fire." The reader is to understand, then, that the
people of Nicaragua are overjoyed over this contra victory, in accord with
Times doctrine. In the forefront of the photo is a cheering woman
wearing an FSLN (Sandinista) T-shirt. There are three signs visible. One
states that "the others should comply," since Nicaragua had already complied
with the accords. A second reads: "Popular power cannot be discussed after 26
years of [the people's] struggle," a familiar Sandinista slogan. The third,
not entirely readable, apparently calls for closing of La Prensa.
Not precisely what the Times is laboring to convey.43
It would be an error to describe such media subservience as totalitarianism
in the Stalinist or Nazi style. In totalitarian states, those who serve power
have the excuse of fear. Here we see, rather, a form of voluntary servitude, a
remarkable and pervasive feature of the intellectual culture.
For its first commentary on the initial three-month phase of the accords,
the Times selected James Chace, a noted dove. Accordingly, he
expressed pleasure with the progress on all fronts, even Nicaragua, where
President Ortega "has agreed to negotiate indirectly with the contras," thus
indicating that at last "the Sandinistas seem determined to fulfill the main
provisions" of the agreement, as defined by Washington. But "there is still,
of course, a long way to go" in consummating the accords, because "the
Sandinistas have not yet declared a general amnesty or lifted the state of
emergency." Apart from continued Sandinista obstruction, Chace sees no
problems during the three-month period, though as a dove, he opposes renewed
contra aid and criticizes the Reagan administration for remaining "suspicious
and hostile," while conceding that it has good grounds, since "the Guatemala
agreement does not provide for reductions in Soviet aid to Managua" so that
"America's legitimate security concerns" are not addressed. Among the topics
unmentioned are: U.S. actions to undermine the accords; the violation of their
essential provisions by the U.S. client states; the fact that "Soviet aid to
Managua" was a major achievement of the Reagan administration, which blocked
aid from elsewhere while launching an attack on Nicaragua, and that the
Guatemala agreement also does not provide for reductions in U.S. aid to its
client states; that others, besides the beleaguered and helpless United
States, have "legitimate security concerns," among them Nicaragua and the
victims of U.S. aid in the terror states; that Managua has long offered to
exclude foreign advisers and negotiate verifiable security guarantees, efforts
successfully blocked by Washington; that if Nicaragua poses "security
concerns" for the United States, then Luxembourg poses security concerns for
the Soviet Union, and Denmark, a member of a hostile military alliance, poses
far greater concerns, so that the USSR is entitled, by our principles, to
organize terrorist forces to attack and overthrow their governments unless
they agree to disarm and offer verifiable guarantees that they will no longer
threaten the Soviet Union. In short, the very model of a well-behaved dove, as
designed by the Office of Public Diplomacy.44
As always, it is the duty of the liberal doves to set the limits of
thinkable thought. This has always been the essence of the American system of
indoctrination, brilliantly effective among the educated classes, though
"enemy territory" remains out of control, a continuing problem.
Putting irrelevant fact aside, the operative question today is whether
Washington can convert the "key issues" it designates into a justification for
expanding the war against Nicaragua. The problem that arose after Nicaragua's
offer to negotiate with the CIA civilian front can surely be overcome by U.S.
propaganda and military operations. As we have seen, the latter were
immediately escalated in accord with the dedication of the terrorist
superpower to the unlawful use of force, with the compliance of the doves, who
loyally evade this unwelcome issue. Washington has also attempted in other
ways to elicit a hostile Nicaraguan response that might be utilized by the
State Department Office of Public Diplomacy in its struggles in "enemy
territory" at home. The Reagan administration sent Secretary of Education
William Bennett, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and assorted contra supporters (David
Horowitz, Ronald Radosh, etc.) to Nicaragua, where they delivered inflammatory
public addresses denouncing the Sandinistas and praising the U.S. proxy army
attacking Nicaragua, prominently reported in the press (with approval, in
La Prensa). But unfortunately, these efforts elicited no reaction
that could be exploited for propaganda purposes.
We might, incidentally, ask what would happen if a Libyan official or
Qaddafi enthusiast were to arrive in Tel Aviv to deliver a public address
praising Abu Nidal. Or suppose a Japanese cabinet minister had landed in
Washington in 1942 (when the national territory was not under attack or even
threat -- in fact, it had not been threatened since the War of 1812) to
deliver diatribes about American racism and injustice and to call for the
forceful overthrow of the government by the "freedom fighters" then liberating
the Philippines and other Western colonies. We need not speculate, since as
distinct from totalitarian Nicaragua, Israel and the United States would never
tolerate any such act for one instant. In fact, the U.S. has barred even
anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan legislators who are opposed to contra aid, mothers
tortured by Duarte's security services who were invited by NOW to speak in New
England towns, a delegate from the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission to a UN
session on disarmament and development that the U.S. boycotted, among many
others -- for example, the Canadian publisher of several of my books, still
barred from our sacred soil because he opposed U.S. aggression in Indochina.
All such matters are off the agenda, and in our extraordinary imperial
arrogance, we take for granted that Nicaragua must tolerate the infantile
antics and vulgar abuse that are a Washington specialty, in a manner that no
other state would endure -- surely not the U.S. or its allies.
The attack against Nicaragua and the programs of state terror to suppress
democracy and social reform in the client states reflect an elite consensus.
That is why they are not discussed in any minimally serious way. The media
will not expose what they know to be true, and Congress will not constrain the
terrorist commanders as long as they seem to be succeeding in their tasks. The
fate of the Central American accords lies in the hands of the domestic enemy
of the state, the citizens in "enemy territory" at home. As so often in the
past, dissent, protest, pressures of a wide variety that escape elite control
can modify the calculus of costs of planners, and offer a slight hope that
Washington can be compelled to permit at least some steps towards "justice,
freedom and democracy" within its domains.
Notes
1 For discussion of the background, and references
not cited here, see my Culture of Terrorism (South End, 1988).
2 AP, Nov. 1, 1987.
3 AP, Nov. 11, 1987.
4 Marjorie Miller, Los Angeles Times,
Sept. 14, 1987; AP, Nov. 6, 1987; Mesoamerica, Oct. 1987; Peter
Ford, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 2.
5 Neil Lewis, NYT, Nov. 12, 1987. See
AP and Pamela Constable, BG, same day, stating the facts
correctly. Constable also cites the World Court condemnation of the U.S. for
unlawful use of force and violation of treaties in the following sanitized
version: the Court "found that the Sandinista government's doctrines did not
constitute an international threat and did not justify US military
intervention."
6 Richard Boudreaux and Marjorie Miller, LAT,
Oct. 5.
7 AP, Nov. 21, 1987; Witness for Peace,
Civilian Victims of the U.S. Contra War, February-July 1987, p. 5.
8 AP, BG, Nov. 6; editorial WP,
Nov. 6; Lindsey Gruson, NYT, Nov. 5, 1987.
9 BG, Nov. 20, 1987.
10 Brian Barger, UPI, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Oct. 22, 1987. Excelsior (Mexico City), Oct. 22, 1987.
11 AP, Nov. 10; Pamela Constable, BG,
Nov. 11; AP, NYT, Nov. 11, 1987, p. 14.
12 The Civilian Toll 1986-1987,
Americas Watch, Aug. 30, 1987; Americas Watch Petition to U.S. Trade
Representative, May 29, 1987.
13 AP, Nov. 4, 1987; Mesoamerica, Nov.
1987.
14 Donn Downey, Toronto Globe and Mail,
Oct. 28; Manuel Torres Calderon, Excelsior (Mexico City), Oct. 7;
COHA's Washington Report on the Hemisphere, Oct. 28;
Latinamerica Press (Peru), Oct. 29; Excelsior, Nov. 4,
1987.
15 Latinamerica press, Nov. 19, 1987.
16 NYT, Nov. 29, 1987.
17 AP, NYT, Oct. 8; Keith Richburg,
WP, Oct. 8; Clayton Jones, CSM, Nov. 10, 1987.
18 On the State of Emergency, see Avigdor Feldman,
B. Michael, Hadashot, Aug. 14, 1987.
19 Oct. 26, 1987.
20 James LeMoyne, Nov. 15, mentioned that Honduras
had established a Commission but that it had as yet done nothing.
21 Brook Larmer, CSM, Nov. 23, 1987.
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs estimates assassinations, abductions, and
disappearances at a dozen a month; News and Analysis, Nov. 10,
1987.
22 Latinamerica press (Peru), 19 Nov.,
1987. Diego Ribadeneira, BG, Nov. 29, 1987.
23 AP, Nov. 15, 1987, reporting the Archbishop's
homily at the Metropolitan Cathedral where he "said the Legal Office [Tutela
Legal] had information a death squad was responsible," citing also other death
squad killings.
24 Americas Watch Petition, May 29, 1987. Marty
Rosenbluth, International Labour Reports, Yorkshire, England; reprinted in
News from Within (West Jerusalem), Oct. 31, 1987.
25 NYT, Nov. 29, 1987.
26 Nov. 4, 1987.
27 Oct. 28, 1987.
28 NYT, Nov. 24, 1987.
29 Lindsey Gruson, James LeMoyne, Elaine Sciolino,
Oct. 29; LeMoyne, Nov. 29, 1987.
30 Chris Norton, Toronto Globe & Mail,
Nov. 5, 1987.
31 William Branigin, WP, Nov. 2, 1987.
32 CSM, Oct. 20, 1987.
33 Guatemala City; Globe and Mail, Nov.
25, 1987.
34 CAR, 16 October, 1987.
35 NYT, Nov. 10, 1987.
36 LeMoyne, Nov. 5, 1987.
37 Harper's, October 1987; memo
released at the Iran-contra hearings.
38 Reuters, NYT, Nov. 9; Kinzer,
NYT, Nov. 18, 1987.
39 Leiken, New Republic, Dec. 14, 1987;
LeMoyne, NYT, Nov. 29, 1987.
40 New Republic, Dec. 14. Among other
examples, we might note Leiken's triumphant claim that "the contras
released their Sandinista prisoners," referring to the release of 80
"Nicaraguan prisoners of war" on September 18, also hailed by the Free Press,
which reported happily that most chose to stay in Costa Rica. In Central
America, however, "the speculation is that they may be disaffected contras or
contras who would rather be inside Costa Rica by November 7" (Central
America Report, Guatemala City, Sept. 26); "The symbolism of the
gesture was tainted somewhat after several of the prisoners admitted to being
contras and others said they had been denounced as Sandinista infiltrators in
the contra ranks and were arrested" (Mesoamerica, San Jose, Costa
Rica), Oct. 1987.
41 James Clarity, NYT, Nov. 1.
42 Pamela Constable, BG, Nov. 8, 1987.
43 Peter Ford reports from Managua that "the tens of
thousands of Sandinista supporters in Revolution square offered no response
when the President announced...talks with the contra leadership," and other
steps highly touted here were "met with a baffled silence," though his defiant
challenge to "aggression against the Nicaraguan people" received "enthusiastic
applause"; CSM, Nov. 9, 1987.
44 James Chace, NYT, Nov. 9, 1987.
