The concept of "rogue state" plays a pre-eminent role today in policy
planning and analysis. The current Iraq crisis is only the latest example.
Washington and London declared Iraq a "rogue state," a threat to its neighbors
and to the entire world, an "outlaw nation" led by a reincarnation of Hitler
who must be contained by the guardians of world order, the United States and
its British "junior partner," to adopt the term ruefully employed by the
British foreign office half a century ago. The concept merits a close look.
But first, let’s consider its application in the current crisis.
The most interesting feature of the debate over the Iraq crisis is that it
never took place. True, many words flowed, and there was dispute about how to
proceed. But discussion kept within rigid bounds that excluded the obvious
answer: the U.S. and UK should act in accord with their laws and treaty
obligations.
The relevant legal framework is formulated in the Charter of the United
Nations, a "solemn treaty" recognized as the foundation of international law
and world order, and under the U.S. Constitution, "the supreme law of the
land."
The Charter states that "The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42," which detail the preferred "measures not
involving the use of armed force" and permit the Security Council to take
further action if it finds such measures inadequate. The only exception is
Article 51, which permits the "right of individual or collective self-defense"
against "armed attack...until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." Apart from these
exceptions, member states "shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force."
There are legitimate ways to react to the many threats to world peace. If
Iraq’s neighbors feel threatened, they can approach the Security Council to
authorize appropriate measures to respond to the threat. If the U.S. and
Britain feel threatened, they can do the same. But no state has the authority
to make its own determinations on these matters and to act as it chooses; the
U.S. and UK would have no such authority even if their own hands were clean,
hardly the case.
Outlaw states do not accept these conditions: Saddam’s Iraq, for example,
or the United States. Its position was forthrightly articulated by Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright, then UN Ambassador, when she informed the
Security Council during an earlier U.S. confrontation with Iraq that the U.S.
will act "multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as we must," because "We
recognize this area as vital to U.S. national interests" and therefore accept
no external constraints. Albright reiterated that stand when UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook his February 1998 diplomatic mission:
"We wish him well," she stated, "and when he comes back we will see what he
has brought and how it fits with our national interest," which will determine
how we respond. When Annan announced that an agreement had been reached,
Albright repeated the doctrine: "It is possible that he will come with
something we don’t like, in which case we will pursue our national interest."
President Clinton announced that if Iraq fails the test of conformity (as
determined by Washington), "everyone would understand that then the United
States and hopefully all of our allies would have the unilateral right to
respond at a time, place and manner of our own choosing," in the manner of
other violent and lawless states.
The Security Council unanimously endorsed Annan’s agreement, rejecting
U.S./UK demands that it authorize their use of force in the event of
non-compliance. The resolution warned of "severest consequences," but with no
further specification. In the crucial final paragraph, the Council "decides,
in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter, to remain actively
seized of the matter, in order to ensure implementation of this resolution and
to ensure peace and security in the area." The Council, no one else; in
accordance with the Charter.
The facts were clear and unambiguous. Headlines read: "An Automatic Strike
Isn’t Endorsed" (Wall St. Journal); "U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on threat to
Iraq if it Breaks Pact" (New York Times); etc. Britain’s UN Ambassador
"privately assured his colleagues on the council that the resolution does not
grant the United States and Britain an ‘automatic trigger’ to launch strikes
against Iraq if it impedes" UN searches. "It has to be the Security Council
who determines when to use armed force," the Ambassador of Costa Rica
declared, expressing the position of the Security Council.
Washington’s reaction was different. U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson
asserted that the agreement "did not preclude the unilateral use of force" and
that the U.S. retains its legal right to attack Baghdad at will. State
Department spokesperson James Rubin dismissed the wording of the resolution as
"not as relevant as the kind of private discussions that we’ve had": "I am not
saying that we don’t care about that resolution," but "we’ve made clear that
we don’t see the need to return to the Security Council if there is a
violation of the agreement." The President stated that the resolution
"provides authority to act" if the U.S. is dissatisfied with Iraqi compliance;
his press secretary made clear that that means military action. "U.S Insists
It Retains Right to Punish Iraq," the New York Times headline read,
accurately. The U.S. has the unilateral right to use force at will: Period.
Some felt that even this stand strayed too close to our solemn obligations
under international and domestic law. Senate majority leader Trent Lott
denounced the Administration for having "subcontracted" its foreign policy "to
others"—to the UN Security Council. Senator John McCain warned that "the
United States may be subordinating its power to the United Nations," an
obligation only for law-abiding states. Senator John Kerry added that it would
be "legitimate" for the U.S. to invade Iraq outright if Saddam "remains
obdurate and in violation of the United Nations resolutions, and in a position
of threat to the world community," whether the Security Council so determines
or not. Such unilateral U.S. action would be "within the framework of
international law," as Kerry conceives it. A liberal dove who reached national
prominence as an opponent of the Vietnam War, Kerry explained that his current
stand was consistent with his earlier views. Vietnam taught him that the force
should be used only if the objective is "achievable and it meets the needs of
your country." Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was therefore wrong for only one
reason: it was not "achievable," as matters turned out.
At the liberal-dovish end of the spectrum, Annan’s agreement was welcomed,
but within the narrow framework that barred the central issues. In a typical
reaction, the Boston Globe stated that had Saddam not backed down, "the
United States would not only have been justified in attacking Iraq—it would
have been irresponsible not to," with no further questions asked. The editors
also called for "a universal consensus of opproprium" against "weapons of mass
destruction" as "the best chance the world has of keeping perverted science
from inflicting hitherto unimagined harm." A sensible proposal; one can think
of easy ways to start, without the threat of force, but these are not what are
intended.
Political analyst William Pfaff deplored Washington’s unwillingness to
consult "theological or philosophical opinion," the views of Thomas Aquinas
and Renaissance theologian Francisco Suarez—as "a part of the analytical
community" in the U.S. and UK had done "during the 1950s and 1960s," seeking
guidance from "philosophy and theology"! But not the foundations of
contemporary international and domestic law, which are explicit, though
irrelevant to the intellectual culture. Another liberal analyst urged the U.S.
to face the fact that if its incomparable power "is really being exercised for
mankind’s sake, mankind demands some say in its use," which would not be
permitted by "the Constitution, the Congress nor television’s Sunday pundits";
"And the other nations of the world have not assigned Washington the right to
decide when, where and how their interests should be served" (Ronald Steel).
The Constitution does happen to provide such mechanisms, namely, by
declaring valid treaties "the supreme law of the land," particularly the most
fundamental of them, the UN Charter. It further authorizes Congress to "define
and punish...offenses against the law of nations," undergirded by the Charter
in the contemporary era. It is, furthermore, a bit of an understatement to say
that other nations "have not assigned Washington the right"; they have
forcefully denied it that right, following the (at least rhetorical) lead of
Washington, which largely crafted the Charter.
Reference to Iraq’s violation of UN resolutions was regularly taken to
imply that the two warrior states have the right to use force unilaterally,
taking the role of "world policemen"—an insult to the police, who in principle
are supposed to enforce the law, not tear it to shreds. There was criticism of
Washington’s "arrogance of power," and the like, not quite the proper terms
for a self-designated violent outlaw state.
One might contrive a tortured legal argument to support U.S./UK claims,
though no one really tried. Step one would be that Iraq has violated UN
Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, which declares a cease-fire "upon official
notification by Iraq" that it accepts the provisions that are spelled out
(destruction of weapons, inspection, etc.). This is probably the longest and
most detailed Security Council on record, but it mentions no enforcement
mechanism. Step two of the argument, then, would be that Iraq’s non-compliance
"reinvokes" Resolution 678 (29 Nov. 1990). That Resolution authorizes member
states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660" (2
August 1990), which calls on Iraq to withdraw at once from Kuwait and for Iraq
and Kuwait "to begin immediately intensive negotations for the resolution of
their differences," recommending the framework of the Arab League. Resolution
678 also invokes "all subsequent relevant resolutions" (listing them: 662,
664); these are "relevant" in that they refer to the occupation of Kuwait and
Iraqi actions relating to it. Reinvoking 678 thus leaves matters as they were:
with no authorization to use force to implement the later Resolution 687,
which brings up completely different issues, authorizing nothing beyond
sanctions.
There is no need to debate the matter. The U.S. and UK could readily have
settled all doubts by calling on the Security Council to authorize their
"threat and use of force," as required by the Charter. Britain did take some
steps in that direction, but abandoned them when it became obvious, at once,
that the Security Council would not go along. But these considerations have
little relevance in a world dominated by rogue states that reject the rule of
law.
Suppose that the Security Council were to authorize the use of force to
punish Iraq for violating the cease-fire UN Resolution 687. That authorization
would apply to all states: for example, to Iran, which would therefore by
entitled to invade southern Iraq to sponsor a rebellion. Iraq is a neighbor
and the victim of U.S.-backed Iraqi aggression and chemical warfare, and could
claim, not implausibly, that its invasion would have some local support; the
U.S. and UK can make no such claim. Such Iranian actions, if imaginable, would
never be tolerated, but would be far less outrageous than the plans of the
self-appointed enforcers. It is hard to imagine such elementary observations
entering public discussion in the U.S. and UK.
Contempt for the rule of law is deeply rooted in U.S. practice and
intellectual culture. Recall, for example, the reaction to the judgment of the
World Court in 1986 condemning the U.S. for "unlawful use of force" against
Nicaragua, demanding that it desist and pay extensive reparations, and
declaring all U.S. aid to the contras, whatever its character, to be "military
aid," not "humanitarian aid." The Court was denounced on all sides for having
discredited itself. The terms of the judgment were not considered fit to
print, and were ignored. The Democrat-controlled Congress immediately
authorized new funds to step up the unlawful use of force. Washington vetoed a
Security Council resolution calling on all states to respect international
law—not mentioning anyone, though the intent was clear. When the General
Assembly passed a similar resolution, the U.S. voted against it, effectively
vetoing it, joined only by Israel and El Salvador; the following year, only
the automatic Israeli vote could be garnered. Little of this received mention
in the media or journals of opinion, let alone what it signifies.
Secretary of State George Shultz meanwhile explained (April 14, 1986) that
"Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not
cast across the bargaining table." He condemned those who advocate "utopian,
legalistic means like outside mediation, the United Nations, and the World
Court, while ignoring the power element of the equation"—sentiments not
without precedent in modern history.
The open contempt for Article 51 is particularly revealing. It was
demonstrated with remarkable clarity immediately after the 1954 Geneva accords
on a peaceful settlement for Indochina, regarded as a "disaster" by
Washington, which moved at once to undermine them. The National Security
Council secretly decreed that even in the case of "local Communist subversion
or rebellion not constituting armed attack," the U.S. would consider
the use of military force, including an attack on China if it is "determined
to be the source" of the "subversion" (NSC 5429/2; my emphasis). The wording,
repeated verbatim annually in planning documents, was chosen so as to make
explicit the U.S. right to violate Article 51. The same document called for
remilitarizing Japan, converting Thailand into "the focal point of U.S. covert
and psychological operations in Southeast Asia," undertaking "covert
operations on a large and effective scale" throughout Indochina, and in
general, acting forcefully to undermine the Accords and the UN Charter. This
critically important document was grossly falsified by the Pentagon Papers
historians, and has largely disappeared from history.
The U.S. proceeded to define "aggression" to include "political warfare, or
subversion" (by someone else, that is)—what Adlai Stevenson called "internal
aggression" while defending JFK’s escalation to a full-scale attack against
South Vietnam. When the U.S. bombed Libyan cities in 1986, the official
justification was "self defense against future attack." New York Times
legal specialist Anthony Lewis praised the Administration for relying "on a
legal argument that violence [in this case] is justified as an act of
self-defense," under this creative interpretation of Article 51 of the
Charter, which would have embarrassed a literate high school student. The U.S.
invasion of Panama was defended in the Security Council by Ambassador Thomas
Pickering by appeal to Article 51, which, he declared, "provides for the use
of armed force to defend a country, to defend our interests and our people,"
and entitles the U.S. to invade Panama to prevent its "territory from being
used as a base for smuggling drugs into the United States." Educated opinion
nodded sagely in assent.
In June 1993, Clinton ordered a missile attack on Iraq, killing civilians
and greatly cheering the president, congressional doves, and the press, who
found the attack "appropriate, reasonable and necessary." Commentators were
particularly impressed by Ambassador Albright’s appeal to Article 51. The
bombing, she explained, was in "self-defense against armed attack"—namely, an
alleged attempt to assassinate former president Bush two months earlier, an
appeal that would have scarcely risen to the level of absurdity even if the
U.S. had been able to demonstrate Iraqi involvement; "Administration
officials, speaking anonymously," informed the press "that the judgment of
Iraq’s guilt was based on circumstantial evidence and analysis rather than
ironclad intelligence," the New York Times reported, dismissing the
matter. The press assured elite opinion that the circumstances "plainly fit"
Article 51 (Washington Post). "Any President has a duty to use military
force to protect the nation’s interests" (New York Times, while
expressing some skepticism about the case in hand). "Diplomatically, this was
the proper rationale to invoke," and "Clinton’s reference to the UN charter
conveyed an American desire to respect international law" (Boston Globe).
Article 51 "permits states to respond militarily if they are threatened by a
hostile power" (Christian Science Monitor). Article 51 entitles a state
to use force "in self-defence against threats to one’s nationals," British
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd instructed Parliament, supporting Clinton’s
"justified and proportionate exercise of the right of self-defence." There
would be a "dangerous state of paralysis" in the world, Hurd continued, if the
U.S. were required to gain Security Council approval before launching missiles
against an enemy that might—or might not—have ordered a failed attempt to kill
an ex-President two months earlier.
The record lends considerable support to the concern widely voiced about
"rogue states" that are dedicated to the rule of force, acting in the
"national interest" as defined by domestic power; most ominously, rogue states
that anoint themselves global judge and executioner.
Rogue States: the Narrow Construction
It is also interesting to review the issues that did enter the non-debate
on the Iraq crisis. But first a word about the concept "rogue state."
The basic conception is that although the Cold War is over, the U.S. still
has the responsibility to protect the world—but from what? Plainly it cannot
be from the threat of "radical nationalism"—that is, unwillingness to submit
to the will of the powerful. Such ideas are only fit for internal planning
documents, not the general public. From the early 1980s, it was clear that the
conventional technique for mass mobilization was losing its effectiveness: the
appeal to JFK’s "monolithic and ruthless conspiracy," Reagan’s "evil empire."
New enemies were needed.
At home, fear of crime—particularly drugs—was stimulated by "a variety of
factors that have little or nothing to do with crime itself," the National
Criminal Justice Commission concluded, including media practices and "the role
of government and private industry in stoking citizen fear," "exploiting
latent racial tension for political purposes," with racial bias in enforcement
and sentencing that is devastating black communities, creating a "racial
abyss" and putting "the nation at risk of a social catastrophe." The results
have been described by criminologists as "the American Gulag," "the new
American Apartheid," with African Americans now a majority of prisoners for
the first time in U.S. history, imprisoned at well over seven times the rate
of whites, completely out of the range of arrest rates, which themselves
target blacks far out of proportion to drug use or trafficking.
Abroad, the threats were to be "international terrorism," "Hispanic
narcotraffickers," and most serious of all, "rogue states." A secret 1995
study of the Strategic Command, which is responsible for the strategic nuclear
arsenal, outlines the basic thinking. Released through the Freedom of
Information act, the study, Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,
"shows how the United States shifted its deterrent strategy from the defunct
Soviet Union to so-called rogue states such as Iraq, Libya, Cuba and North
Korea," AP reports. The study advocates that the U.S. exploit its nuclear
arsenal to portray itself as "irrational and vindictive if its vital interests
are attacked." That "should be a part of the national persona we project to
all adversaries," particularly the "rogue states." "It hurts to portray
ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed," let alone committed to such
silliness as international law and treaty obligations. "The fact that some
elements" of the U.S. government "may appear to be potentially ‘out of
control’ can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within
the minds of an adversary’s decision makers." The report resurrects Nixon’s
"madman theory": our enemies should recognize that we are crazed and
unpredictable, with extraordinary destructive force at our command, so they
will bend to our will in fear. The concept was apparently devised in Israel in
the 1950s by the governing Labor Party, whose leaders "preached in favor of
acts of madness," Prime Minister Moshe Sharett records in his diary, warning
that "we will go crazy" ("nishtagea") if crossed, a "secret weapon" aimed in
part against the U.S., not considered sufficiently reliable at the time. In
the hands of the world’s sole superpower, which regards itself as an outlaw
state and is subject to few constraints from elites within, that stance poses
no small problem for the world.
Libya was a favorite choice as "rogue state" from the earliest days of the
Reagan administration. Vulnerable and defenseless, it is a perfect punching
bag when needed: for example, in 1986, when the first bombing in history
orchestrated for prime time TV was used by the Great Communicator’s speech
writers to muster support for Washington’s terrorist forces attacking
Nicaragua, on grounds that the "archterrorist" Qaddafi "has sent $400 million
and an arsenal of weapons and advisors into Nicaragua to bring his war home to
the United States," which was then exercising its right of self-defense
against the armed attack of the Nicaraguan rogue state.
Immediately after the Berlin Wall fell, ending any resort to the Soviet
threat, the Bush administration submitted its annual call to Congress for a
huge Pentagon budget. It explained that "In a new era, we foresee that our
military power will remain an essential underpinning of the global balance,
but...the more likely demands for the use of our military forces may not
involve the Soviet Union and may be in the Third World, where new capabilities
and approaches may be required," as "when President Reagan directed American
naval and air forces to return to [Libya] in 1986" to bombard civilian urban
targets, guided by the goal of "contributing to an international environment
of peace, freedom and progress within which our democracy—and other free
nations—can flourish." The primary threat we face is the "growing
technological sophistication" of the Third World. We must therefore strengthen
"the defense industrial base"—aka high tech industry—creating incentives "to
invest in new facilities and equipment as well as in research and
development." And we must maintain intervention forces, particularly those
targeting the Middle East, where the "threats to our interests" that have
required direct military engagement "could not be laid at the Kremlin’s door"
—contrary to endless fabrication, now put to rest. As had occasionally been
recognized in earlier years, sometimes in secret, the "threat" is now conceded
officially to be indigenous to the region, the "radical nationalism" that has
always been a primary concern, not only in the Middle East.
At the time, the "threats to our interests" could not be laid at Iraq’s
door either. Saddam was then a favored friend and trading partner. His status
changed only a few months later, when he misinterpreted U.S. willingness to
allow him to modify the border with Kuwait by force as authorization to take
the country over—or from the perspective of the Bush administration, to
duplicate what the U.S. had just done in Panama. At a high-level meeting
immediately after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, President Bush articulated the
basic problem: "My worry about the Saudis is that they’re...going to bug out
at the last minute and accept a puppet regime in Kuwait." Chair of the Joint
Chiefs Colin Powell posed the problem sharply: "The next few days Iraq will
withdraw," putting "his puppet in" and "Everyone in the Arab world will be
happy."
Historical parallels are never exact, of course. When Washington partially
withdrew from Panama after putting its puppet in, there was great anger
throughout the hemisphere, including Panama. Indeed throughout much of the
world, compelling Washington to veto two Security Council resolutions and to
vote against a General Assembly resolution condemning Washington’s "flagrant
violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of states" and calling for the withdrawal of the "US
armed invasion forces from Panama." Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was treated
differently, in ways remote from the standard version, but readily discovered
in print (including this magazine).
The inexpressible facts shed interesting light on the commentary of
political analysts: Ronald Steel, for example, who muses today on the
"conundrum" faced by the U.S., which, "as the world’s most powerful nation,
faces greater constraints on its freedom to use force than does any other
country." Hence Saddam’s success in Kuwait as compared with Washington’s
inability to exert its will in Panama.
It is worth recalling that debate was effectively foreclosed in 1990-1991
as well. There was much discussion of whether sanctions would work, but none
of whether they already had worked, perhaps shortly after Resolution 660 was
passed. Fear that sanctions might have worked animated Washington’s refusal to
test Iraqi withdrawal offers from August 1990 to early January. With the
rarest of exceptions, the information system kept tight discipline on the
matter. Polls a few days before the January 1991 bombing showed 2-1 support
for a peaceful settlement based on Iraqi withdrawal along with an
international conference on the Israel-Arab conflict. Few among those who
expressed this position could have heard any public advocacy of it; the media
had loyally followed the President’s lead, dismissing "linkage" as
unthinkable—in this unique case. It is unlikely that any respondents knew that
their views were shared by the Iraqi democratic opposition, barred from
mainstream media. Or that an Iraqi proposal in the terms they advocated had
been released a week earlier by U.S. officials who found it reasonable, and
flatly rejected by Washington. Or that an Iraqi withdrawal offer had been
considered by the National Security Council as early as mid-August, but
dismissed, and effectively suppressed, apparently because it was feared that
unmentioned Iraqi initiatives might "defuse the crisis," as the New York
Times diplomatic correspondent obliquely reported Administration concerns.
Since then, Iraq has displaced Iran and Libya as the leading "rogue state."
Others have never entered the ranks. Perhaps the most relevant case is
Indonesia, which shifted from enemy to friend when General Suharto took power
in 1965, presiding over an enormous slaughter that elicited great satisfaction
in the West. Since then Suharto has been "our kind of guy," as the Clinton
administration described him, while carrying out murderous aggression and
endless atrocities against his own people; killing 10,000 Indonesians just in
the 1980s, according to the personal testimony of "our guy," who wrote that
"the corpses were left lying around as a form of shock therapy." In December
1975 the UN Security Council unanimously ordered Indonesia to withdraw its
invading forces from East Timor "without delay" and called upon "all States to
respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable
right of its people to self-determination." The U.S. responded by (secretly)
increasing shipments of arms to the aggressors; Carter accelerated the arms
flow once again as the attack reached near-genocidal levels in 1978. In his
memoirs, UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan takes pride in his success in
rendering the UN "utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook,"
following the instructions of the State Department, which "wished things to
turn out as they did and worked to bring this about." The U.S. also happily
accepts the robbery of East Timor’s oil (with participation of a U.S.
company), in violation of any reasonable interpretation of international
agreements.
The analogy to Iraq/Kuwait is close, though there are differences: to
mention only the most obvious, U.S.-sponsored atrocities in East Timor were
vastly beyond anything attributed to Saddam Hussein in Kuwait.
There are many other examples, though some of those commonly invoked should
be treated with caution, particularly concerning Israel. The civilian toll of
Israel’s U.S.-backed invasion of Lebanon in 1982 exceeded Saddam’s in Kuwait,
and it remains in violation of a 1978 Security Council resolution ordering it
to withdraw forthwith from Lebanon, along with numerous others regarding
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and other matters; and there would be far more
if the U.S. did not regularly veto such resolutions. But the common charge
that Israel, particularly its current government, is violating UN 242 and the
Oslo Accords, and that the U.S. exhibits a "double standard" by tolerating
those violations, is dubious at best, based on serious misunderstanding of
these agreements. From the outset, the Madrid-Oslo process was designed and
implemented by U.S.-Israeli power to impose a Bantustan-style settlement. The
Arab world has chosen to delude itself about the matter, as have many others,
but they are clear in the actual documents, and particularly in the
U.S.-supported projects of the Rabin-Peres governments, including those for
which the current Likud government is now being denounced.
It is clearly untrue to claim that "Israel is not demonstrably in violation
of Security Council decrees" (New York Times), but the reasons often
given should be examined carefully.
Returning to Iraq, it surely qualifies as a leading criminal state.
Defending the U.S. plan to attack Iraq at a televised public meeting on
February 18, Secretaries Albright and Cohen repeatedly invoked the ultimate
atrocity: Saddam was guilty of "using weapons of mass destruction against his
neighbors as well as his own people," his most awesome crime. "It is very
important for us to make clear that the United States and the civilized world
cannot deal with somebody who is willing to use those weapons of mass
destruction on his own people, not to speak of his neighbors," Albright
emphasized in an angry response to a questioner who asked about U.S. support
for Suharto. Shortly after, Senator Lott condemned Kofi Annan for seeking to
cultivate a "human relationship with a mass murderer," and denounced the
Administration for trusting a person who would sink so low.
Ringing words. Putting aside their evasion of the question raised, Albright
and Cohen only forgot to mention—and commentators have been kind enough not to
point out—that the acts that they now find so horrifying did not turn Iraq
into a "rogue state." And Lott failed to note that his heroes Reagan and Bush
forged unusually warm relations with the "mass murderer." There were no
passionate calls for a military strike after Saddam’s gassing of Kurds at
Halabja in March 1988; on the contrary, the U.S. and UK extended their strong
support for the mass murderer, then also "our kind of guy." When ABC TV
correspondent Charles Glass revealed the site of one of Saddam’s biological
warfare programs ten months after Halabja, the State Department denied the
facts, and the story died; the Department "now issues briefings on the same
site," Glass observes.
The two guardians of global order also expedited Saddam’s other
atrocities—including his use of cyanide, nerve gas, and other barbarous
weapons—with intelligence, technology, and supplies, joining with many others.
The Senate Banking Committee reported in 1994 that the U.S. Commerce
Department had traced shipments of "biological materials" identical to those
later found and destroyed by UN inspectors, Bill Blum recalls. These shipments
continued at least until November 1989. A month later, Bush authorized new
loans for his friend Saddam, to achieve the "goal of increasing U.S. exports
and put us in a better position to deal with Iraq regarding its human rights
record...," the State Department announced with a straight face, facing no
criticism in the mainstream (or even report).
Britain’s record was exposed, at least in part, in an official inquiry
(Scott Inquiry). The British government has just now been compelled to concede
that it continued to grant licenses to British firms to export materials
usable for biological weapons after the Scott report was published, at least
until December 1996.
In a February 28 review of Western sales of materials usable for germ
warfare and other weapons of mass destruction, the Times mentions one
example of U.S. sales in the 1980s, including "deadly pathogens," with
government approval, some from the Army’s center for germ research in Fort
Detrick. Just the tip of the iceberg, however.
A common current pretense is Saddam’s crimes were unknown, so we are now
properly shocked at the discovery and must "make clear" that we civilized folk
"cannot deal with" the perpetrator of such crimes (Albright). The posture is
cynical fraud. UN Reports of 1986 and 1987 condemned Iraq’s use of chemical
weapons. U.S. Embassy staffers in Turkey interviewed Kurdish survivors of
chemical warfare attacks, and the CIA reported them to the State Department.
Human Rights groups reported the atrocities at Halabja and elsewhere at once.
Secretary of State George Shultz conceded that the U.S. had evidence on the
matter. An investigative team sent by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 1988 found "overwhelming evidence of extensive use of chemical weapons
against civilians," charging that Western acquiescence in Iraqi use of such
weapons against Iran had emboldened Saddam to believe—correctly—that he could
use them against his own people with impunity—actually against Kurds, hardly
"the people" of this tribal-based thug. The chair of the Committee, Claiborne
Pell, introduced the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, denouncing silence
"while people are gassed" as "complicity," much as when "the world was silent
as Hitler began a campaign that culminated in the near extermination of
Europe’s Jews," and warning that "we cannot be silent to genocide again." The
Reagan administration strongly opposed sanctions and insisted that the matter
be silenced, while extending its support for the mass murderer. In the Arab
world, "the Kuwait press was amongst the most enthusiastic of the Arab media
in supporting Baghdad’s crusade against the Kurds," journalist Adel Darwish
reports.
In January 1991, while the war drums were beating, the International
Commission of Jurists observed to the UN Human Rights Commission that "After
having perpetrated the most flagrant abuses on its own population without a
word of reproach from the UN, Iraq must have concluded it could do whatever it
pleased"; UN in this context means U.S. and UK, primarily. That truth must be
buried along with international law and other "utopian" distractions.
An unkind commentator might remark that recent U.S./UK toleration for
poison gas and chemical warfare is not too surprising. The British used
chemical weapons in their 1919 intervention in North Russia against the
Bolsheviks, with great success according to the British command. As Secretary
of State at the War Office in 1919, Winston Churchill was enthusiastic about
the prospects of "using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes"—Kurds and
Afghans—and authorized the RAF Middle East command to use chemical weapons
"against recalcitrant Arabs as experiment," dismissing objections by the India
office as "unreasonable" and deploring the "squeamishness about the use of
gas": "we cannot in any circumstances acquiesce in the non-utilisation of any
weapons which are available to procure a speedy termination of the disorder
which prevails on the frontier," he explained; chemical weapons are merely
"the application of Western science to modern warfare."
The Kennedy administration pioneered the massive use of chemical weapons
against civilians as it launched its attack against South Vietnam in
1961-1962. There has been much rightful concern about the effects on U.S.
soldiers, but not the incomparably worse effects on civilians. Here, at least.
In an Israeli mass-circulation daily, the respected journalist Amnon Kapeliouk
reported on his 1988 visit to Vietnam, where he found that "Thousands of
Vietnamese still die from the effects of American chemical warfare," citing
estimates of one-quarter of a million victims in South Vietnam and describing
the "terrifying" scenes in hospitals in the south with children dying of
cancer and hideous birth deformities. It was South Vietnam that was targeted
for chemical warfare, not the North, where these consequences are not found,
he reports. There is also substantial evidence of U.S. use of biological
weapons against Cuba, reported as minor news in 1977, and at worst only a
small component of continuing U.S. terror.
These precedents aside, the U.S. and UK are now engaged in a deadly form of
biological warfare in Iraq. The destruction of infrastructure and banning of
imports to repair it has caused disease, malnutrition, and early death on a
huge scale, including 567,000 children by 1995, according to UN
investigations; UNICEF reports 4,500 children dying a month in 1996. In a
bitter condemnation of the sanctions (January 20, 1998), 54 Catholic Bishops
quoted the Archbishop of the southern region of Iraq, who reports that
"epidemics rage, taking away infants and the sick by the thousands" while
"those children who survive disease succumb to malnutrition." The Bishop’s
statement, reported in full in Stanley Heller’s journal The Struggle,
received scant mention in the press. The U.S. and Britain have taken the lead
in blocking aid programs—for example, delaying approval for ambulances on the
grounds that they could be used to transport troops, barring insecticides to
prevent spread of disease and spare parts for sanitation systems. Meanwhile,
western diplomats point out, "The U.S. had directly benefited from [the
humanitarian] operation as much, if not more, than the Russians and the
French," for example, by purchase of $600 million worth of Iraqi oil (second
only to Russia) and sale by U.S. companies of $200 million in humanitarian
goods to Iraq. They also report that most of the oil bought by Russian
companies ends up in the U.S.
Washington’s support for Saddam reached such an extreme that it was even
willing to overlook an Iraqi air force attack on the USS Stark,
killing 37 of the crew, a privilege otherwise enjoyed only by Israel (in the
case of the USS Liberty). It was Washington’s decisive support
for Saddam, well after the crimes that now so shock the Administration and
Congress, that led to Iranian capitulation to "Baghdad and Washington," Dilip
Hiro concludes in his history of the Iran-Iraq war. The two allies had
"co-ordinate[d] their military operations against Teheran." The shooting down
of an Iranian civilian airliner by the guided-missile cruiser Vincennes
was the culmination of Washington’s "diplomatic, military and economic
campaign" in support of Saddam, he writes.
Saddam was also called upon to perform the usual services of a client
state: for example, to train several hundred Libyans sent to Iraq by the U.S.
so they could overthrow the Qaddafi government, former Reagan White House aide
Howard Teicher revealed.
It was not his massive crimes that elevated Saddam to the rank of "Beast of
Baghdad." Rather, it was his stepping out of line, much as in the case of the
far more minor criminal Noriega, whose major crimes were also committed while
he was a U.S. client.
In passing, one might note that the destruction of Iran Air 655 in Iranian
airspace by the Vincennes may come back to haunt Washington. The
circumstances are suspicious, to say the least. In the Navy’s official
journal, Commander David Carlson wrote that he "wondered aloud in disbelief"
as he observed from his nearby vessel as the Vincennes—then within
Iranian territorial waters—shot down what was obviously a civilian airliner in
a commercial corridor, perhaps out of "a need to prove the viability of
Aegis," its high tech missile system. The commander and key officers "were
rewarded with medals for their conduct," Marine Corps colonel (retired) David
Evans observes in the same journal in an acid review of the Navy Department
cover-up of the affair. President Bush informed the UN that "One thing is
clear, and that is that the Vincennes acted in self-defense...in the
midst of a naval attack initiated by Iranian vessels...," all lies Evans
points out, though of no significance, given Bush’s position that "I will
never apologize for the United States of America—I don’t care what the facts
are." A retired Army colonel who attended the official hearings concluded that
"our Navy is too dangerous to deploy."
It is difficult to avoid the thought that the destruction of Pan Am 103
over Lockerbie a few months later was Iranian retaliation, as stated
explicitly by Iranian intelligence defector Abolhassem Mesbahi, also an aide
to President Rafsanjani, "regarded as a credible and senior Iranian source in
Germany and elsewhere," the Guardian reports. A 1991 U.S. intelligence
document (National Security Agency), declassified in 1997, draws the same
conclusion, alleging that Akbar Mohtashemi, a former Iranian interior
minister, transferred $10 million "to bomb Pan Am 103 in retaliation for the
U.S. shoot-down of the Iranian Airbus," referring to his connections with "the
Al Abas and Abu Nidal terrorist groups." It is striking that despite the
evidence and the clear motive, this is virtually the only act of terrorism
not blamed on Iran. Rather, the U.S. and UK have charged two Libyan
nationals with the crime.
The charges against the Libyans have been widely disputed, including a
detailed inquiry by Denis Phipps, former head of security at British Airways
who served on the government’s National Aviation Committee. The British
organization of families of Lockerbie victims believe that there has been "a
major cover-up" (spokesperson Dr. Jim Swire), and regard as more credible the
account given in Alan Frankovich’s documentary The Maltese Cross, which
provides evidence of the Iranian connection and a drug operation involving a
courier working for the U.S. DEA. The film was shown at the British House of
Commons and on British TV, but rejected here. The U.S. families keep strictly
to Washington’s version.
Also intriguing is the U.S./UK refusal to permit a trial of the accused
Libyans. This takes the form of rejection of Libya’s offer to release the
accused for trial in some neutral venue: to a judge nominated by the UN
(December 1991), a trial at the Hague "under Scottish law," etc. These
proposals have been backed by the Arab League and the British relatives
organization but flatly rejected by the U.S./UK. In March 1992, the UN
Security Council passed a resolution imposing sanctions against Libya, with
five absentions: China, Morocco (the only Arab member), India, Zimbabwe, Cape
Verde. There was considerable arm-twisting: thus China was warned that it
would lose U.S. trade preferences if it vetoed the resolution. The U.S. press
has reported Libya’s offer to release the suspects for trial, dismissing it as
worthless and ridiculing Qaddafi’s "dramatic gesture" of calling for the
surrender of U.S. pilots who bombed two Libyan cities, killing 37 people,
including his adopted daughter. Plainly, that is as absurd as requests by Cuba
and Costa Rica for extradition of U.S. terrorists.
It is understandable that the U.S./UK should want to ensure a trial they
can control, as in the case of the Noriega kidnapping. Any sensible defense
lawyer would bring up the Iranian connection in a neutral venue. How long the
charade can continue is unclear. In the midst of the current Iraq crisis, the
World Court rejected the U.S./UK claim that it has no jurisdiction over the
matter, and intends to launch a full hearing (13-2, with the U.S. and British
judges opposed), which may make it harder to keep the lid on.
The Court ruling was welcomed by Libya and the British families. Washington
and the U.S. media warned that the World Court ruling might prejudice the 1992
UN resolution that demanded that "Libya must surrender those accused of the
Lockerbie bombing for trial in Scotland or the United States" (New York
Times), that Libya "extradite the suspects to the United States and
Britain" (AP). These claims are not accurate. The issue of transfer to
Scotland or the U.S. never arose, and is not mentioned in the UN Resolutions.
Resolution 731 (21 January 1992) "Urges the Libyan Government immediately to
provide a full and effective response" to requests "in connection with the
legal procedures" related to attacks against Pan Am 103 and a French airliner.
Resolution 748 (31 March 1992) "Decides that the Libyan Government must now
comply without any further delay" with the request of Resolution 731, and that
it renounce terrorism, calling for sanctions if Libya fails to do so.
Resolution 731 was adopted in response to a U.S./UK declaration that Libya
must "surrender for trial all those charged with the crime," with no further
specification.
Press reports at the time were similarly inaccurate. Thus, reporting the
U.S. dismissal of the Libyan offer to turn the suspects over to a neutral
country, the New York Times highlighted the words: "Again, Libya tries
to avoid a U.N. order." The Washington Post dismissed the offer as
well, stating that "The Security Council contends that the suspects must be
tried in U.S. or British courts." Doubtless Washington prefers to have matters
seen in this light. A correct account was given in a 1992 opinion piece by
international legal authority Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School (Christian
Science Monitor), who noted that the Security Council resolution makes no
mention of extradition to the U.S. and UK, and observes that its wording
"departs so far from what the United States, Britain, and France are reported
to have wanted that current public statements and press accounts reporting an
American diplomatic triumph and UN pressures on Libya seem incomprehensible";
unfortunately, the performance is all too routine.
In the NY Times, British specialist on UN law Marc Weiler, in an
op-ed, agreed with Rubin that the U.S. should follow the clear requirements of
international law and accept Libya’s proposal for World Court adjudication.
Libya’s response to the U.S./UK request was "precisely as mandated by
international law," Weiler wrote, condemning the U.S./UK for having "flatly
refused" to submit the issue to the World Court. Rubin and Weiler also ask
obvious further questions: Suppose that New Zealand had resisted powerful
French pressures to compel it to abandon its attempt to extradite the French
government terrorists who had bombed the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland
harbor? Or that Iran were to demand that the captain of the Vincennes
be extradited?
The World Court has now drawn
the same conclusion as Rubin and Weiler.
The qualifications as "rogue state" are illuminated further by Washington’s
reaction to the uprisings in Iraq in March 1991, immediately after the
cessation of hostilities. The State Department formally reiterated its refusal
to have any dealings with the Iraqi democratic opposition, and as from before
the Gulf War, they were virtually denied access to the major U.S. media.
"Political meetings with them would not be appropriate for our policy at this
time," State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher stated. "This time"
happened to be March 14, 1991, while Saddam was decimating the southern
opposition under the eyes of General Schwartzkopf, refusing even to permit
rebelling military officers access to captured Iraqi arms. Had it not been for
unexpected public reaction, Washington probably would not have extended even
tepid support to rebelling Kurds, subjected to the same treatment shortly
after.
Iraqi opposition leaders got the message. Leith Kubba, head of the
London-based Iraqi Democratic Reform Movement, alleged that the U.S. favors a
military dictatorship, insisting that "changes in the regime must come from
within, from people already in power." London-based banker Ahmed Chalabi, head
of the Iraqi National Congress, said that "the United States, covered by the
fig leaf of non-interference in Iraqi affairs, is waiting for Saddam to
butcher the insurgents in the hope that he can be overthrown later by a
suitable officer," an attitude rooted in the U.S. policy of "supporting
dictatorships to maintain stability."
Administration reasoning was outlined by New York Times chief
diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman. While opposing a popular rebellion,
Washington did hope that a military coup might remove Saddam, "and then
Washington would have the best of all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi junta
without Saddam Hussein," a return to the days when Saddam’s "iron fist...held
Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and
Saudi Arabia," not to speak of Washington. Two years later, in another useful
recognition of reality, he observed that "it has always been American policy
that the iron-fisted Mr. Hussein plays a useful role in holding Iraq
together," maintaining "stability." There is little reason to believe that
Washington has modified the preference for dictatorship over democracy
deplored by the ignored Iraqi democratic opposition, though it doubtless would
prefer a different "iron fist" at this point. If not, Saddam will have to do.
The concept "rogue state" is highly nuanced. Thus Cuba qualifies as a
leading "rogue state" because of its alleged involvement in international
terrorism, but the U.S. does not fall into the category despite its terrorist
attacks against Cuba for close to 40 years, apparently continuing through last
summer according to important investigative reporting of the Miami Herald,
which failed to reach the national press (here; it did in Europe). Cuba was a
"rogue state" when its military forces were in Angola, backing the government
against South African attacks supported by the U.S. South Africa, in contrast,
was not a rogue state then, nor during the Reagan years, when it caused over
$60 billion in damage and 1.5 million deaths in neighboring states according
to a UN Commission, not to speak of some events at home—and with ample U.S./UK
support. The same exemption applies to Indonesia and many others.
The criteria are fairly clear: a "rogue state" is not simply a criminal
state, but one that defies the orders of the powerful—who are, of course,
exempt.
More On "The Debate"
That Saddam is a criminal is undoubtedly true, and one should be pleased, I
suppose, that the U.S. and UK, and *mainstream doctrinal institutions, have at
last joined those who "prematurely" condemned U.S./UK support for the mass
murderer. It is also true that he poses a threat to anyone within his reach.
On the comparison of the threat with others, there is little unanimity outside
the U.S. and UK, after their (ambiguous) transformation from August 1990.
Their 1998 plan to use force was justified in terms of Saddam’s threat to the
region, but there was no way to conceal the fact that the people of the region
objected to their salvation, so strenuously that governments were compelled to
join in opposition.
Bahrein refused to allow U.S./British forces to use bases there. The
president of the United Arab Emirates described U.S. threats of military
action as "bad and loathsome," and declared that Iraq does not pose a threat
to its neighbors. Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan had already stated that
"We’ll not agree and we are against striking Iraq as a people and as a
nation," causing Washington to refrain from a request to use Saudi bases.
After Annan’s mission, long-serving Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud
al-Faisal reaffirmed that any use of Saudi air bases "has to be a UN, not a
U.S. issue."
An editorial in Egypt’s quasi-official journal Al Ahram described
Washington’s stand as "coercive, aggressive, unwise and uncaring about the
lives of Iraqis, who are unnecessarily subjected to sanctions and
humiliation," and denounced the planned U.S. "aggression against Iraq."
Jordan’s Parliament condemned "any aggression against Iraq’s territory and any
harm that might come to the Iraqi people"; the Jordanian army was forced to
seal off the city of Maan after two days of pro-Iraq rioting. A political
science professor at Kuwait University warned that "Saddam has come to
represent the voice of the voiceless in the Arab world," expressing popular
frustration over the "New World Order" and Washington’s advocacy of Israeli
interests.
Even in Kuwait, support for the U.S. stance was at best "tepid" and
"cynical over U.S. motives," the press recognized. "Voices in the streets of
the Arab world, from Cairo’s teeming slums to the Arabian Peninsula’s shiny
capitals, have been rising in anger as the American drumbeat of war against
Iraq grows louder," Boston Globe correspondent Charles Sennott
reported.
The Iraqi democratic opposition was granted a slight exposure in the
mainstream, breaking the previous pattern. In a telephone interview with the
New York Times, Ahmed Chalabi reiterated the position that had been
reported in greater detail in London weeks earlier: "Without a political plan
to remove Saddam’s regime, military strikes will be counter-productive," he
argued, killing thousands of Iraqis, leaving Saddam perhaps even strengthened
along with his weapons of mass destruction and with "an excuse to throw out
UNSCOM [the UN inspectors]," who have in fact destroyed vastly more weapons
and production facilities than the 1991 bombing. U.S./UK plans would "be worse
than nothing." Interviews with opposition leaders from several groups found
"near unanimity" in opposing military action that did not lay the basis for an
uprising to overthrow Saddam. Speaking to a Parliamentary committee, Chalabi
held that it was "morally indefensible to strike Iraq without a strategy" for
removing Saddam.
In London, the opposition also outlined an alternative program: (1) declare
Saddam a war criminal; (2) recognize a provisional Iraqi government formed by
the opposition; (3) unfreeze hundreds of millions of dollars of Iraqi assets
abroad; restrict Saddam’s forces by a "no-drive zone" or extend the "no-flight
zone" to cover the whole country. The U.S. should "help the Iraqi people
remove Saddam from power," Chalabi told the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Along with other opposition leaders, he "rejected assassination, covert U.S.
operations or U.S. ground troops," Reuters reported, calling instead for "a
popular insurgency." Similar proposals have occasionally appeared in the U.S.
Washington claims to have attempted support for opposition groups, but their
own interpretation is different. Chalabi’s view, published in England, is much
as it was years earlier: "everyone says Saddam is boxed in, but it is the
Americans and British who are boxed in by their refusal to support the idea of
political change."
Regional opposition was regarded as a problem to be evaded, not a factor to
be taken into account, any more than international law. The same was true of
warnings by senior UN and other international relief officials in Iraq that
the planned bombing might have a "catastrophic" effect on people already
suffering miserably, and might terminate the humanitarian operations that have
brought at least some relief. What matters is to establish that "What We Say
Goes," as President Bush triumphantly proclaimed, announcing the New World
Order as bombs and missiles were falling in 1991.
As Kofi Annan was preparing to go to Baghdad, former Iranian president
Rafsanjani, "still a pivotal figure in Tehran, was given an audience by the
ailing King Fahd in Saudi Arabia," British Middle East correspondent David
Gardner reported, "in contrast to the treatment experienced by Madeleine
Albright...on her recent trips to Riyadh seeking support from America’s main
Gulf ally." As Rafsanjani’s ten-day visit ended on March 2, foreign minister
Prince Saud described it as "one more step in the right direction towards
improving relations," reiterating that "the greatest destabilising element in
the Middle East and the cause of all other problems in the region" is Israel’s
policy towards the Palestinians and U.S. support for it, which might activate
popular forces that Saudi Arabia greatly fears, as well as undermining its
legitimacy as "guardian" of Islamic holy places, including the Dome of the
Rock in East Jerusalem, now effectively annexed by U.S./Israeli programs as
part of their intent to extend "greater Jerusalem" virtually to the Jordan
Valley, to be retained by Israel. Shortly before, the Arab states had
boycotted a U.S.-sponsored economic summit in Qatar that was intended to
advance the "New Middle East" project of Clinton and Peres. Instead, they
attended an Islamic conference in Teheran in December, joined even by Iraq.
These are tendencies of considerable import, relating to the background
concerns that motivate U.S. policy in the region: its insistence, since World
War II, on controlling the world’s major energy reserves. As many have
observed, in the Arab world there is growing fear and resentment of the
long-standing Israel-Turkey alliance that was formalized in 1996, now greatly
strengthened. For some years, it had been a component of the U.S. strategy of
controlling the region with "local cops on the beat," as Nixon’s Defense
Secretary put the matter. There is apparently a growing appreciation of the
Iranian advocacy of regional security arrangements to replace U.S. domination.
A related matter is the intensifying conflict over pipelines to bring Central
Asian oil to the rich countries, one natural outlet being via Iran.
**And U.S. energy corporations will not be happy to see foreign rivals—now
including China and Russia as well—gain privileged access to Iraqi oil
reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia in scale, or to Iran’s natural gas, oil,
and other resources.
For the present, Clinton planners may well be
relieved to have escaped temporarily from the "box" they had constructed that
was leaving them no option but a bombing of Iraq that could have been harmful
even to the interests they represent. The respite is temporary. It offers
opportunities to citizens of the warrior states to bring about changes of
consciousness and commitment that could make a great difference in the not too
distant future.
