On October 30, the US-brokered conference on the Middle East opened in
Madrid. The conference was described on all sides as a "historic event," a
remarkable achievement of George Bush's diplomacy and the tenacity of his
Secretary of State James Baker in exploiting the "historic window of
opportunity" opened by changes in the world order. These observations are not
unrealistic, when understood within their historical and policy context -- a
question of perspective and judgment, of course. I will review the way these
matters look to me, contrasting that picture with a different one that
dominates public discussion.
Three related questions arise at once about the current diplomatic efforts:
First, why are they taking place right now? Second, do they signify a
departure from the traditional US stand? Third, what is the meaning of the
disputes between the US and Israel?
The answer to the first question is clear enough. The Bush administration
desperately needs a foreign policy success to obscure the outcome of its war
in the Gulf: hundreds of thousands killed and the toll mounting as a long-term
consequence of the devastating attack on the civilian society; the Gulf
tyrannies safeguarded from any democratic pressures; Saddam Hussein firmly in
power, having demolished popular rebellions with tacit US support. US
government interests and goals are hardly concealed. Washington seeks "the
best of all worlds," New York Times chief diplomatic
correspondent Thomas Friedman explains: "an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without
Saddam Hussein," a return to the days when Saddam's "iron fist held Iraq
together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi
Arabia," along with the Reagan-Bush administrations, which gave unwavering
support to their murderous ally. These images, however, cannot be left in the
public memory in the United States or elsewhere. The reality can be effaced by
what the press describes as the "remarkable tableau" in Madrid, with its
promise of a "sweet victory" built on the ruins of the Gulf slaughter.1
Furthermore, the Arab clients who lined up in the US war must be helped to
maintain some credibility. This requires gestures to suggest that the US-led
crusade aimed at something more than merely reinforcing US dominance over the
oil-producing regions, with the family dictatorships of the Gulf playing their
traditional role as an "Arab Facade," in the words of British imperialists of
earlier days.
It is also necessary to divert the attention of the American public from
the social and economic crisis resulting from Reagan-Bush domestic programs.
Under such conditions, any powerful state would seek diversionary foreign
policy exploits.
The second question is also readily answered: the available evidence
reveals no departure from the traditional US stance on a Middle East
settlement. In fact, another reason for the current diplomatic efforts is that
the US monopoly of violence now offers a "historic window of opportunity" to
advance traditional US goals.
The urgency of the current Bush-Baker diplomacy is understandable. Not
surprisingly, Washington refused to permit the Madrid conference to be
derailed by the intransigence of Israeli hawks, even at the cost of a
confrontation with the government of Israel and its domestic lobby.
That brings us to the third question, the Bush-Shamir conflict. Though
real, it is narrowly circumscribed. There is no fundamental disagreement about
the denial of Palestinian rights or US support for measures to extend Israeli
control over the territories, just as both governments agree that Soviet Jews
should be denied freedom of choice and directed to Israel, with the US paying
the bill on humanitarian pretexts. Not an eyebrow is raised when the Jewish
Agency meets in Jerusalem to demand that Jewish organizations "unite to
sabotage" any efforts to open US doors to Soviet Jews, while in the Israeli
press, Minister of Immigration and Absorption Michael Kleiner explains how he
will induce Germany to reverse its decision to admit Soviet Jews but no other
refugees: "Germany has already fulfilled its quota for discrimination
concerning Jews in this century," Kleiner will inform these German criminals,
"and the time has come for it to treat Jews just like other people" -- denying
entry to Jewish refugees, so that they can be forced to Israel.2
The cynicism of the enterprise will surprise only those unfamiliar with the
vastly more shameful practices of the 1940s, well into the post-Holocaust
years when the miserable remnants of the extermination camps were treated in
much the same way.
The Bush-Shamir conflict arose over the timing of US guarantees for loans
-- which may eventually turn into grants -- for the theoretical purpose of
absorbing Soviet immigrants, though in fact they will be used to expand
settlement in the occupied territories, whatever formalism is adopted. Huge
sums are being "spilled like water" into the territories by the Israeli
government for "ordinary and deluxe settlements," including elegant subsidized
villas for privileged settlers, the Israeli press reports, diverting the funds
that Israel has available to absorb Soviet immigrants (thanks to US largesse).
And while "Jewish immigration from the USSR may be a great accomplishment in
Zionist or Jewish terms, there is nothing humanitarian about it.... The
humanitarianism is one of the lies the two states have agreed upon," in full
knowledge that "the Jews of the USSR are now better off than any other ethnic
group in that country," protected by foreign powers, able to leave if they
wish, permitted to obtain foreign currency from abroad, and so on -- surely
far better off than the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and others
fleeing torture and harsh repression in Kuwait, most of them crowding into
impoverished Jordan, or numerous other examples that readily come to mind.
Israel's 1992 budget calls for up to $2 billion for expanding settlement in
the territories, an amount "equivalent to one year's installment of the loan
guarantees that Israel wants from the United States," the New York Times
reports, hence an amount that Israel can take from other sources if these
funds are assured by US "humanitarian" assistance.3
An official US decision to provide financial support for these projects
would have made it very difficult for the US Arab allies to attend the Madrid
conference; a few months down the road, it is assumed, the matter can be
handled without too much fanfare. Ariel Sharon and other Israeli extremists
were unwilling to accept even a temporary delay in their ambitious settlement
project, and were also intent on undermining the US-run negotiations, which
might interfere with their annexationist plans. That is one reason why
"official Israel was dead silent" about the August coup attempt in the Soviet
Union, while "some influential Israelis found it advisable to extend to the
conspirators their joyous greetings and good advice," possibly including
Shamir's expert advisers, the Israeli press reported, noting that a successful
coup in the USSR might have undermined the unwanted Madrid conference.4
After the Soviet coup, the US propaganda system produced the required gestures
of outrage about the alleged support for the coup or vacillation about it on
the part of assorted official enemies, while keeping "dead silent" about
unwanted realities, the usual pattern when atrocities and crimes afford an
opportunity for service to power.
The Bush-Shamir dispute goes beyond the timing of US financial support for
Israeli settlement plans. There are real disagreements between Washington and
the current Israeli government, serious and long-standing ones. But they
concern the modalities of rejectionism, not its essence, a matter that merits
a closer examination, to which we return.
To clarify what follows, by the term "rejectionism" I mean the rejection of
the right to national self-determination on the part of one or the other
of the contending parties in the former Palestine. This is distinct from US
usage, which restricts the term to those who reject the rights of Israeli
Jews, denial of the right of self-determination of the indigenous inhabitants
being considered proper and natural.
The standard usage reflects the limits of US discussion, largely restricted
to support for some version of Israeli rejectionism. At one extreme, we find
those who suggest that Palestinians deserve nothing, like all of those who
stand in the way of civilization. Others, like Times chief
diplomatic correspondent and Middle East specialist Thomas Friedman, take a
more forthcoming approach, because "only if you give the Palestinians
something to lose is there a hope that they will agree to moderate their
demands," abandoning the ludicrous hope for mutual recognition in a two-state
settlement -- a "demand" that Friedman refused to report and consistently
denied while producing the "balanced and informed coverage" for which he
received the Pulitzer prize. "I believe that as soon as Ahmed has a seat in
the bus, he will limit his demands," Friedman added, adopting the racist
rhetoric used as a matter of course when dealing with the lower orders. He
advised Israel to run the territories on the model of South Lebanon,
controlled by Israeli troops and a terrorist surrogate army, with a hideous
torture chamber in Khiam where hundreds are held hostage to ensure that the
population will submit, Israeli administration of the flow and profits of
heroin from the second largest drug production area in Lebanon (the most
productive being the Bekaa valley, run by Bush's other friend, Hafez el-Assad
of Syria), and regular bombardment beyond the borders to prevent resistance --
called "terrorism," a term that extends to attacks on drug cultivators
protected by the Israeli army and its clients.5
At the time of the US-Israel confrontation, it took scarcely more than a
raised eyebrow from the President for the Israeli lobby to collapse, while
major journals that rarely veer from the Israeli Party line took the cue and
began to run articles critical of Israeli practices and hinting that US
support for them was not inevitable. That should also occasion little
surprise. Domestic pressure groups tend to be ineffectual unless they line up
with significant elements of state-corporate power, or have reached a scale
and intensity that compels moves to accommodate them. When AIPAC lobbies for
policies that the state executive and major sectors of corporate America
intend to pursue, it is influential; when it confronts authentic power,
largely unified, it fades very quickly.
The essential issues just reviewed are more or less recognized within the
doctrinal system, though they are presented more obliquely. It is no great
secret that alleged "foreign policy triumphs," quickly removed from view to
obscure what has actually taken place, can help to divert the public from
domestic crises, along with racist and jingoist appeals, manufacture of
awesome foreign and internal enemies, and other familiar devices of population
control. The utility of the Madrid conference in obscuring Gulf realities is
outlined by New York Times diplomatic correspondent R. W. Apple
in the column already quoted, as the conference opened: "Critics have
suggested that the United States achieved far too little in the war, because
Saddam Hussein was not overthrown, Iran remained as hostile and Kuwait as
undemocratic as ever, and Saudi Arabia shed neither its isolation nor its
archaic ways." But the "remarkable tableau" in Madrid revealed "that a very
great deal had changed," thanks to the "diplomatic skills" of James Baker and
the Gulf triumph. Thus "George Bush and the United States today plucked the
fruits of victory in the Persian Gulf war, but it is still much too early to
predict how sweet they will be."
To rephrase in more accurate terms, by limiting the options in the Gulf to
violence, its strong card, Washington was able to determine the basic contours
of what happened. It barred any challenge to the "iron fist" in the client
states. It continues to torture the Iraqi people exactly as planned in the
attack on the civilian infrastructure, which had no relation to the military
conflict -- this was not a long war against Nazi Germany -- but did lay the
basis for postwar US policies, including the current policy of holding the
population hostage to induce some tolerable duplicate of Saddam Hussein to
restore "the best of all worlds." Iraq aside, the US also intends to exploit
the opportunity to teach valuable lessons to others who might have odd ideas
about disobeying US orders, another standard policy; thus in mid-October,
Washington once again blocked European and Japanese efforts to call off the
embargo that the US imposed on Vietnam 16 years ago after direct conquest
failed.6
Those who do not follow the rules must be severely punished, indefinitely, and
others must learn these lessons -- though the lessons must remain invisible to
the American public, who are to be regaled with tales about the nobility of
our aspirations and the grand achievements of our leaders.
Crucially, the American public must not be allowed to perceive that the
outcome in the Gulf reveals the priorities of the state that held all the
cards, the state that could accurately proclaim that "What we say goes," in
the President's words. The consequences of Washington's decisions must
therefore be construed as a failure to achieve our noble goals, now to be
compensated by Washington's diplomatic triumphs.
The US Versus the Peace Process
Let us turn to the second question raised at the outset, and examine
whether it is indeed correct to stress the continuity of US goals and
policies.
For many years, the US has stood virtually alone in opposition to
international efforts to initiate a "peace process" on the Middle East. The UN
record brings out the issues with considerable clarity. The Security Council
was eliminated as a forum years ago, thanks to the US veto. At its annual
winter meetings, the General Assembly regularly passes resolutions calling for
a conference on the Arab-Israel crisis, most recently, in December 1990
(144-2, US and Israel in opposition). In December 1989, the vote was 151-3,
Dominica joining the two rejectionist states; a year earlier, 138-2; and so
on. US international isolation dates to February 1971 -- coincidentally, the
very month when George Bush achieved national prominence as UN Ambassador. The
US has also barred other initiatives. Given US power, its opposition amounts
to a veto. Accordingly, there has been no international effort to deal with
the conflict. The peace process has been effectively deterred.
Again, the matter is described differently within the ideological system;
in this case, just about universally, including scholarship. We read
constantly that the Middle East is "littered with American peace plans"
(editorial, Boston Globe),7
and that US efforts have continually run aground because of the fanaticism and
irrationality of Middle East extremists. Such descriptions are accurate, if we
bear in mind the literary conventions: the term "peace process" is restricted
to US government initiatives, including moves to bar attempts to achieve
peace. It then follows as a matter of logic that the US is always advancing
the peace process, and if internationally isolated, as in this case, it is
alone in this endeavor. Efforts that the uninstructed might misconstrue as
"the peace process" are really attempts to obstruct peace, that is, to
interfere with US plans. It is really quite simple, once the norms of
political correctness are understood.
Departing from these norms, one should have no difficulty in understanding
the traditional US opposition to the peace process. The UN resolutions call
for an international conference, and the US brooks no interference in
what President Eisenhower described as the most "strategically important area
in the world," with its enormous energy reserves. This is US turf: no
independent force is allowed, foreign or indigenous. As Henry Kissinger
explained in a private communication, one of his major policy goals was "to
ensure that the Europeans and Japanese did not get involved in the diplomacy"
concerning the Middle East, a goal achieved at Camp David in 1978, and again
in the current diplomacy -- that is, in the two cases that qualify as steps in
the "peace process" in US rhetoric. Furthermore, UN and other initiatives
endorse a Palestinian right of self-determination, which would entail Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories. While there has been an elite policy
split over the matter, the prevailing judgment for the past 20 years has been
that enhancement of Israeli power contributes to US domination of the region.
For these reasons, the US has always blocked attempts at diplomatic
resolution, apart from its own rejectionist initiatives.
It should be noted that the US opposition to diplomacy is not unusual.
Southeast Asian and Central American conflicts provide examples familiar to
those who have escaped the doctrinal system. The same has been true, quite
often, of disarmament and many other issues, and US isolation at the UN
extends far beyond the Middle East. These are natural concomitants of the role
of global enforcer, committed to policies with little appeal to targeted
populations but with ample force at the ready.
The basic terms of the international consensus on the Arab-Israel conflict
were expressed in a resolution brought to the Security Council in January
1976, calling for a settlement on the pre-June 1967 borders (the Green Line)
with "appropriate arrangements...to guarantee...the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right
to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries," including Israel
and a new Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The resolution
was backed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO -- in fact "prepared" by the
PLO according to Israel's UN Ambassador Haim Herzog, now President. It was
strenuously opposed by Israel and vetoed by the United States, once again in
1980.
These events are -- automatically -- out of history, along with other facts
unacceptable to US power, including repeated PLO initiatives through the 1980s
calling for negotiations with Israel leading to mutual recognition. The facts
have been distorted beyond recognition, often barred outright, particularly by
the New York Times. Its Pulitzer prize-winning correspondent
Thomas Friedman has shown particular dedication to the task, an achievement
appreciated by the journal, which promoted him to chief diplomatic
correspondent in recognition of his accomplishments. It is an interesting
case, because he knows enough to understand exactly what he is doing. This
stellar performance permits Friedman to spin wondrous tales about "the birth
of a new pragmatism among the Palestinians" from the late 1980s, now raised
"another important notch" through Baker's benign influence at Madrid. Until
Madrid, Friedman continues, "both sides have hidden behind [the]
argument...that there is no one on the other side with whom to negotiate" --
Timesspeak for the fact that the PLO has for years been calling on Israel to
negotiate, but the US and Israel refuse, claiming there is no one with whom to
negotiate, while Friedman loyally reports as truths the US-Israel propaganda
which he knows perfectly well to be pure fabrication. The Palestinians
admitted by the US to the Madrid conference called "explicitly for a two-state
solution," Friedman writes admiringly -- so different from the despised PLO,
which supported (or perhaps "prepared") the UN resolution calling for a
two-state solution 15 years ago.8
The meaning of these shenanigans -- one of the more impressive achievements
of modern propaganda -- is that the State Department and its spokesman believe
that US-Israeli violence may at last have succeeded in bringing the
Palestinians to heel. In the preferred rhetoric, the great achievement of
Madrid was "the Palestinian self-adjustment to the real world," Palestinian
acceptance of "a period of autonomy under continued Israeli domination,"
during which Israel can build the facts of its permanent domination with US
aid. This willingness to follow US orders -- the real world -- has "tossed the
negative stereotypes out the window," Times journalist Clyde
Haberman observes approvingly. The "autonomy" offered at Madrid had been
described two weeks earlier in Ha'aretz by Danny Rubinstein, one
of the most acute observers of the occupied territories for many years: it is
"autonomy as in a prisoner-of-war camp, where the prisoners autonomous' to
cook their meals without interference and to organize cultural events."9
The most outspoken critic of US Middle East policy, Anthony Lewis, offered
a new proof of the brilliance of Bush-Baker diplomacy. Their "singular
achievement" at Madrid "was quickly measured" by an election in Gaza in which
moderates won a resounding victory over the fundamentalist extremists, sending
"the message that Palestinians are ready to negotiate." This message is "of
profound significance to Israelis," Lewis continues, telling the many doubters
"that there are reasonable Palestinians, people ready to make peace, people
not so different from themselves." In the past, "the ordinary Palestinians,
with familiar aspirations for a decent life and a national identity, were
drowned out by Palestinian terrorists," and "the Palestinian political
leadership" was "reluctant to say plainly that it was ready to live in peace
alongside of Israel." But now the dread PLO is no longer feared and the
moderates can raise their heads, as shown by the Gaza elections in which the
PLO won 13 of 16 seats contested.10
The internal contradiction is easily resolved. We need only recall the real
world, in which the PLO had been calling for negotiations and a peaceful
settlement with Israel for many years, while the US and Israel never countered
with any "reasonable people ready to make peace," just as they do not today,
and Israel supported the fundamentalist extremists in its efforts to fend off
the PLO moderation that it has always feared. But that solution is
unacceptable. In a well-run ideological system, internal contradiction is far
preferable to politically incorrect reality.
Over the years, the US has continued to implement its rejectionist program
without interference from meddling outsiders. The current circumstances afford
an opportunity to carry the process further, with a diplomatic process run
solely by the United States in accord with the principle that "What we say
goes." Gorbachev's presence at Madrid was intended to provide a thin disguise
for unilateral US control; in reality, he is acceptable as the powerless
leader of a country that scarcely exists. The "peace process" is structured in
accordance with US intentions. Palestinians are not permitted to select their
own representatives, and those who pass US-Israel inspection are part of a
Jordanian delegation. The US alone dictates the terms. I will turn to details
and background directly, but the basic facts are surely clear enough.
The standard picture is, again, rather different. Few have been so critical
of US Middle East policy as New York Times correspondent Anthony
Lewis, who lauds the President for having had "the vision and the courage to
commit himself to this conference," in which "Israel will meet face-to-face
with each of its Arab neighbors -- and with representative Palestinians" --
namely, those acceptable to the US and Israel, whatever Palestinians might
prefer. Diplomatic correspondent R. W. Apple expands in a typical paean to our
leader's "vision of the future" as he made use of "the historic window of
opportunity." He identifies two factors that have made it possible for Bush
"to dream such great dreams" about Israel-Arab peace: First, there is now no
fear that "regional tensions" might lead to superpower confrontation; Second,
"no longer must the United States contend with countries whose
cantankerousness was reinforced by Moscow's interest in continuing unrest."11
Both of Apple's points are correct, though translation is again required.
The truth that lies behind his first point is that the withdrawal of the
Soviet Union from the world scene has made it easier for the US to resort to
force to gain its ends, a fact that has led to fear and desperation among the
traditional victims throughout the Third World. One reason why the US insisted
on war in the Gulf, deflecting the danger of a peaceful diplomatic settlement,
was to demonstrate that it is now able to use extremes of violence against
defenseless enemies without concern over the Soviet deterrent. As noted, the
familiar lessons are again being taught in the postwar period.
To interpret Apple's second point, we must recall that the "cantankerous"
agents of Soviet disruption include the US European allies, the major Arab
states, the nonaligned countries, in fact, essentially the world, apart from
Israel. Apple's formulation reflects the standard doctrinal assumption that
the US position on any issue is necessarily RIGHT, as a matter of logic, so
those who stand in our way are "cantankerous," probably Comsymps to boot.
There is an intriguing sidelight to the US-Israeli insistence that the
political representatives of the Palestinians be excluded from negotiations.
The official reason is that the PLO is a terrorist organization. Under Israeli
law, anyone who has any dealings with it is subject to criminal penalties
under the Law for the Prevention of Terror. The prime targets are
Palestinians, but the law has also been used to punish Jews for contacts with
the PLO, most recently, the courageous Abie Nathan, jailed once again.12
The background for the law was reviewed by one of Israel's leading legal
commentators, Moshe Negbi, discussing a recent academic study of Lehi (the
"Stern gang"), published on its 50th anniversary. Negbi's article is entitled
"The Law to Prevent Meetings with the Head of State." As he explains, the Law
for the Prevention of Terror was instituted on the initiative of Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion six days after the assassination of UN Ambassador
Folke Bernadotte. Ben-Gurion's goal was to break up Lehi, known at once to be
responsible for the assassination. One of the three commanders of Lehi was
Yitzhak Shamir. The law not only barred any contact with Shamir, but was also
applied against Menahem Begin's terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etsel), impelling
Begin to dismantle his Jerusalem organization. It was also used to jail
religious extremists, including Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, currently chief
Rabbi. It was bitterly denounced as a "Nazi law, dictatorial, immoral" and
hence illegal, by Menahem Begin and other civil libertarians. Despite efforts
to have it modified under Labor governments, it remained in force, formally
directed against Shamir and his Lehi associates, until 1977, when Begin was
elected Prime Minister. Today the "Nazi law" still remains in force, but only
to bar contacts with the PLO and to justify the US-Israeli refusal to permit
Palestinians to select their own representatives for negotiations.13
Those who think that Shamir might have renounced his past enthusiasm for
terrorism -- which reached quite interesting levels -- might usefully turn to
his comments on the occasion of the anniversary of Lehi on September 4, 1991:
"We believed in what we said, discussed and wrote," he said: "Therefore, it
was correct." "From the moral point of view, there is no difference between
personal terror and collective terror. Here and there blood is spilled, here
and there people are killed. One must look and judge it from the point of view
of the utility of that means, the use of personal terror, in leading to the
goal."14
A US Policy Shift?
Let us now turn to the standard assumption that Bush-Baker diplomacy
represents a considerable departure from traditional US policies. One argument
offered to explain this alleged fact is that the end of the Cold War reduces
Israel's role as a "strategic asset." Anthony Lewis and other doves also argue
that "the gulf war showed that U.S. armed forces could act in the Middle East
without Israel." The upbeat analyses of the doves are also much influenced by
the conflicts that have arisen between the Bush and Shamir governments, which
are taken to show that "a more detached relationship is developing in which
America will more freely weigh its own values and interests," not just follow
the Israeli lead (Lewis).15
None of these arguments is very persuasive.
The first rests on the general assumption that US policies towards the
Third World have been motivated by concern over the Soviet threat. This is
official doctrine for obvious propaganda reasons, but it is hardly
sustainable, often the reverse of the truth, for reasons extensively
documented elsewhere.. With regard to the Middle East, even before the Soviet
pretext was lost serious analysts recognized that "radical nationalism" was
the prime target of US intervention capacity (e.g., Robert Komer, the
architect of President Carter's Rapid Deployment Force, in congressional
testimony). By now it is conceded that the "threats to our interests" in that
region "could not be laid at the Kremlin's door" (White House National
Security Strategy report to Congress, March 1990).16
As for the lessons of the Gulf, surely no one ever doubted that the US could
act without Israel, and in some circumstances would choose to do so. This has
little bearing on Israel's perceived role as a strategic asset, particularly
since the 1960s, when it was regarded by the US as a major barrier to Arab
nationalist pressures against Saudi Arabia, led by Egypt's President Nasser.
The third point is based on a correct observation: there are conflicts
between Bush and Shamir. But as noted, there is no reason to believe that
these are any different from the ones that have arisen for many years,
reflecting different approaches to a rejectionist settlement. Failure to sort
out these matters properly has led to much confusion about what is happening.
Let us begin with the situation within Israel. There are two major
political groupings, Likud and Labor, each a coalition. The position of Likud,
now governing, has always been that Israel should extend its sovereignty over
the occupied territories. Its central component, Prime Minister Shamir's Herut
party, has never abandoned its claim to Jordan, regularly reiterated in its
electoral programs. That was also the traditional position of a central
component of the Labor coalition, based on the largest kibbutz movement, TAKAM
(Ahdut Avodah, historically extremely expansionist), a position never
officially abandoned, to my knowledge.
The logic of the Likud position has recently been outlined by Defense
Minister Moshe Arens, by no means an extremist. "In the final analysis," he
said in a recent interview, "the existence of the State rests on the principle
that we have a right to be here. We are not here by kindness in a land that is
foreign to us.... Any agreement, even conditional, that this right is limited
-- touches on the essence of our existence here." Therefore, "the very
existence of Israel depends on the settlements" in the occupied territories,
and Israel's right to establish them at will.17
Scarcely concealed is the premise that the US taxpayer has the duty to pay the
costs for Israel's "rights."
In conformity with this reasoning, "Since Mr. Baker launched his postwar
peace mission in early March [1991], Israel has confiscated more than 18,000
acres of Arab-owned land as part of its continuing effort to develop the
territories for Jews," the Wall Street Journal reports, and now
has taken title to about 68% of West Bank land by various forms of legalistic
chicanery.18
The Journal draws no conclusions about what this might imply
concerning the nature and intent of "Mr. Baker's peace mission." The operative
assumption of objective journalism is that the US stands by, a helpless
victim, pouring in funds for activities that it is unable to influence.
The Labor coalition, which governed until 1977 and intermittently since,
has preferred a different version of rejectionism. Its position, which has
varied in details over the years, is based on the "Allon plan" adopted in
1968. It calls for Israel to take what it wants in the occupied territories:
the resources, particularly West Bank water, on which Israel heavily relies;
the usable land, including the area around a vastly expanded Jerusalem, now
favored residential areas for the urban centers of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; the
Jordan valley; etc. Similarly, Israel must control the Golan Heights, in
particular, its valuable water resources, now estimated to supply 25% of
Israel's needs19;
with regard to the Golan Heights, Labor is more hawkish than Likud. Earlier
versions also called for Israeli control over Eastern and Northeastern Sinai.
But Israel should not take responsibility for the Arab population
concentrations, which are to remain stateless or administered by Jordan under
effective Israeli control. The reason is "the demographic problem," the burden
of dealing with too many Arabs in what is, by law, "the sovereign State of the
Jewish people" in Israel and the diaspora, not the State of its citizens. A
commitment to deprive too many citizens of rights carries costs that Labor
considers too high. The prevailing assumption has been that if only a
minority, less than 20%, are second-class citizens by law, the costs will be
tolerable, and Western commentators will be able to marvel over Israeli
democracy. But problems increase if the numbers rise high enough to evoke
images of South Africa.
The US has tended to support the more rational Labor party form of
rejectionism, a fact that brings it into occasional conflict with the
government of Israel, as in the past few months. From the point of view of the
Palestinians, there is little to choose between these two positions. Many
Palestinians and Israeli doves regard the Likud version as potentially more
hopeful; and in fact, Likud occupation policies have often been less harsh
than those of the Labor party, contrary to the standard depiction of Labor
doves versus Likud hawks.
The US has also objected to the defiant and brazen settlement programs of
Likud, preferring Labor's technique of quietly "building facts" that will
determine the shape of the final outcome. In this connection, the
disagreements are more about method than goal, as we see when we take a closer
look at the actual policies and the thinking that lies behind them.
The traditional Labor party doctrine was expressed by Prime Minister Golda
Meir in addressing new Soviet immigrants in a meeting on the Golan Heights in
September 1971: "the borders are determined by where Jews live, not where
there is a line on a map." The guiding views were elaborated by her Minister
of Defense, the influential planner Moshe Dayan, often considered something of
a dove. He repeatedly emphasized that the settlements are "permanent," the
basis for "permanent rule" by Israel over the territories: "the settlements
are forever, and the future borders will include these settlements as part of
Israel."
The leading figure of the Labor party, David Ben-Gurion, held essentially
the same view during the period of his political influence. Israeli journalist
Amnon Kapeliouk observed 20 years ago that "every child in Israel knows one of
the most famous expressions of the founder of the Jewish state, David
Ben-Gurion: It is not important what the Gentiles say, what matters is what
the Jews do'." Ben-Gurion's conception, clearly articulated in internal
documents and sometimes in public, was that "a Jewish state...will serve as an
important and decisive stage in the realization of Zionism," but only a
stage: the borders of the state "will not be fixed for eternity," but will
expand either by agreement with the Arabs "or by some other way," once "we
have force at our disposal" in a Jewish State. His long-term vision included
Jordan and beyond, sometimes even "the Land of Israel" from the Nile to the
Euphrates.
During the 1948 war, Ben-Gurion's view was that "To the Arabs of the Land
of Israel only one function remains -- to run away." The words reflected
traditional Zionist attitudes. Chaim Weizmann, the first President of Israel
and the most revered Zionist figure, observed casually that the British had
informed him that in Palestine "there are a few hundred thousand Negroes, but
that is a matter of no significance." Weizmann had in turn informed Lord
Balfour after World War I that "the issue known as the Arab problem in
Palestine will be of merely local character and, in effect, anyone cognizant
of the situation does not consider it a highly significant factor." Hence
displacement of the Arabs and expansion of the Jewish settlement can be
pursued with no moral qualms, merely tactical concerns.20
The preferred image among cultivated US commentators is that Ben-Gurion was
"a decisive man, steeped in classical culture, straightforward," "a man strong
enough to compromise for the good of his people," in dramatic contrast to
Yasser Arafat, who is "wily, certainly persistent and stubborn, gleefully
adept at evasion" (much-respected New York Times columnist Flora
Lewis).21
The reality, fully clear in the documentary record, is that Lewis's
description of Arafat applies no less to Ben-Gurion. And of course, Lewis need
not be concerned about Arafat's support for the 1976 UN resolution, his
repeated calls for negotiations with Israel leading to mutual recognition
through the 1980s, etc., all successfully effaced from history.
The prevailing attitudes of the founders informed the internal policy
planning of the 1967-77 Labor government. The matter is well worth
understanding, because it is the Labor programs that the US government and
more dovish elements in respectable US circles have tended to support. There
is a revealing and well-documented review of cabinet discussions and decisions
by Yossi Beilin, a high-level Labor party functionary close to Shimon Peres,
now the official dove in US propaganda.22
Israel's first policy decision was on June 19, 1967, when a divided (11-10)
cabinet proposed a settlement on the Green Line with Syria and Egypt (with
Israel keeping Gaza), but no mention of Jordan and the West Bank. This
proposal is described by Israeli diplomat Abba Eban in his retrospective
account as "the most dramatic initiative that the government of Israel ever
took before or since." Given the strong opposition to the proposal, it was
kept secret, though it was secretly transmitted to Washington, to be passed on
to Arab states.
As noted, Moshe Dayan was a leading Labor party planner, and West Bank
Arabs look back with some nostalgia to the days of his rule, because of his
recognition of the justice of the Palestinian cause (which, however, must
disappear into the ashcan of history, he held) and his belief that the
authorities should keep out of the personal affairs of their Palestinian
subjects. Dayan's first proposals, described by Beilin as "moderate," were
presented to the cabinet on June 13, 1967. He proposed that Israel should
annex the Gaza strip and "undertake negotiations with the Americans -- but
only them -- about the transfer of Arabs [from the Gaza strip] to the West
Bank" so that Israel would not have to absorb a million Arabs into the State.
If Hussein agrees to accept "autonomy" for the West Bank, then Israel should
allow him formally to take it over while Israel "rules to the Jordan river" in
matters of security and foreign affairs, arrangements that would enable Israel
to "build facts" quietly in the traditional fashion. As noted, the cabinet did
not accept his views, keeping the West Bank and Jordan out of their secret
proposal entirely.
Along with Shimon Peres, Dayan was part of Rafi, the most hawkish sector of
the Labor coalition apart from Ahdut Avodah (the main kibbutz movement). At a
Rafi meeting of September 1967, there was a dispute between Peres and Dayan
after Dayan explained more fully his position with regard to the Palestinian
refugees in the occupied territories: "Let us approach them and say that we
have no solution, that you shall continue to live like dogs, and whoever wants
to can leave -- and we will see where this process leads." After they have
lived "like dogs" under Israeli military occupation, Dayan continued, "It is
possible that in five years we will have 200,000 less people -- and that is a
matter of enormous importance." Peres objected to Dayan's advice that Israel
become "like Rhodesia," arguing that these measures would harm Israel's
international image and prospects for immigration. For these tactical reasons,
he argued, it is necessary to preserve Israel's "moral stand." Dayan's
response was: "Ben-Gurion said that anyone who approaches the Zionist problem
from a moral aspect, he is not a Zionist." He continued to advocate the
Rhodesian solution.
In the same September 1967 meeting, Rafi established its settlement policy,
then implemented. It was written by Peres. He observed that "Israel's new map
will be determined by its policies of settlement and new land-taking," and
therefore called for "urgent efforts" to establish settlements not only in
East Jerusalem, but also "to the north, south and east," including Hebron,
Gush-Etzion, etc.; the Jordan valley; "the central region of the mountains of
Shechem [Nablus]"; the Golan Heights, the El-Arish region in the Sinai and the
Red Sea access. The Labor coalition policies were even more extreme, notably
the Galili protocols of 1973 and the policies implementing them, including the
expulsion of thousands of Beduins into the desert, their homes, mosques and
graveyards destroyed to clear the lands for the all-Jewish city of Yamit in
northern Sinai, steps that led directly to the 1973 war.
Much is made in US propaganda about Israel's eagerness to make peace after
the 1967 war, if the Arabs could only bring themselves to make a simple
telephone call. In a BBC interview on June 13, 1967, Dayan indeed said that
Israel awaits a telephone call from the Arabs: "For our part, we will do
nothing," he added. "We are quite happy with the current situation. If
anything troubles the Arabs, they know where to find us."23
Hardly a passionate plea for peace, particularly when seen in context.
A month before the Rafi meeting, in August 1967, Yigal Allon had advanced
his "Allon plan," which became official policy a year later. Israel's position
after cancellation of the secret 1967 proposal was presented to the UN by Abba
Eban on September 8, 1968. Since then, the Labor coalition has adopted one or
another version of the Allon plan. Its precise terms have never been clearly
established, at least in the public record. But the basic content, sketched
above, has been made reasonably clear along with occasional variations as
circumstances change.
No other Israeli initiatives are known. The general policy for which there
is any documentation, to my knowledge, follows the guidelines expressed by
President Haim Herzog in 1972: "I do not deny the Palestinians any place or
stand or opinion on every matter. But certainly I am not prepared to consider
them as partners in any respect in a land that has been consecrated in the
hands of our nation for thousands of years. For the Jews of this land there
cannot be any partner." Note that Herzog's attitudes are well within the
mainstream of liberal Zionism, including Chaim Weizmann and others.
Given the prevailing assumptions, it is not at all surprising that Dayan
agreed with the policy of blocking all political activities on the West Bank,
including pro-Jordanian activities. True, he was not as extreme as Prime
Minister Golda Meir. Thus in 1972, Dayan at first was willing to permit a
pro-Jordanian political conference in the West Bank, but he raised no
objection when Meir ordered Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel to prevent it.
Labor party policies are described by former Chief of Israeli intelligence
Shlomo Gazit, a senior official of the military administration from 1967 to
1973. The basic principle, he observes, was "that it is necessary to prevent
the inhabitants of the territories from participating in shaping the political
future of the territory and they must not be seen as a partner for dealings
with Israel"; hence "the absolute prohibition of any political organization,
for it was clearly understood by everyone that if political activism and
organization were permitted, its leaders would become potential participants
in political affairs." The same considerations require "the destruction of all
initiative and every effort on the part of the inhabitants of the territories
to serve as a pipeline for negotiations, to be a channel to the Palestinian
Arab leadership of the territories." Israel's policy is a "success story,"
Gazit wrote in 1985, because these goals had been achieved, with continued US
support and to much applause from left-liberal opinion in the United States.24
The Labor coalition began to speak of "territorial compromise only after
the Yom Kippur war" of 1973, Beilin records, and expressed its willingness to
consider "territorial compromise" in the West Bank "only at the end of
February 1977," after "a severe dispute" internally. The terms "territorial
compromise" and "land for peace" are used to refer to one or another version
of the Allon plan, always rejecting entirely the Palestinian right to
self-determination. The term "interim agreement" has a broader propaganda
usage, incorporating either the Labor or the Likud form of rejectionism. These
terms are blandly adopted by US commentators, either deceived by the rhetoric
or engaged in deception themselves.
As noted, the US has favored the Labor variety of rejectionism, more
rational, and better attuned to the norms of Western hypocrisy. These more
devious methods are easier to conceal than Likud expansionism, though the
eventual outcome may not be greatly different. These are the primary issues
that have separated the US and Israel from virtually the entire world. It is
for that reason that the US has been compelled to block the peace process in
the manner briefly reviewed.
Bush-Baker Diplomacy
Until 1988, the US and Israel were more or less satisfied with the status
quo, and were content merely to rebuff Arab and other efforts towards a
peaceful diplomatic settlement while Israel extended its control over the
territories. Problems arose, however, with the outbreak of the Intifada and
the severe Israeli repression, which created negative images and other
unwanted costs. Furthermore, PLO insistence on a political settlement, though
not fundamentally different from earlier years, was becoming more difficult to
suppress. The problem of diverting diplomacy was becoming serious by late
1988, when the US refused to permit Yasser Arafat to address the United
Nations in New York, causing the UN to move its meeting to Geneva. By then,
Secretary of State George Schultz and domestic commentators were becoming an
international laughing stock with their increasingly desperate pretense that
Arafat had failed to say the "magic words" dictated to him by Washington. The
wise decision was made to resort to a familiar diplomatic trick, the "Trollope
ploy": to pretend that Arafat had accepted US demands, welcome his invented
capitulation, then impose upon him the US terms that Washington attributed to
him. It was assumed correctly that the media and intellectual opinion would
adopt Washington's claims without inspection, ignoring the fact -- transparent
to any literate person -- that Arafat's positions remained as far from
Washington's as before, and that no Palestinian spokesperson could possibly
accept the US terms. The farce was played perfectly, and now has entered
history, the facts being consigned to the memory hole in the usual manner of a
well-run modern society.
The PLO's reward for its invented capitulation was a low-level "dialogue"
to divert world attention while Israel turned to harsher measures of
repression to suppress the Intifada. Predictably, the PLO leadership played
along, contributing to the success of the repression. The US-Israeli agreement
was explained by Labor's Defense Secretary, Yitzhak Rabin, who informed Peace
Now leaders in February 1989 that he welcomed the meaningless "dialogue,"
which would offer Israel a year or more to employ "harsh military and economic
pressure." "In the end," Rabin explained, "they will be broken," and will
accept Israel's terms. These plans were implemented, with much success.25
Meanwhile, Israel and the US initiated their own unilateral diplomatic
track, to deflect the danger of an authentic peace process. A Likud-Labor
coalition government proposed the so-called "Shamir Plan" in May 1989, more
accurately the Shamir-Peres Plan.26
The plan's "Basic Premises" are: (1) there can be no "additional Palestinian
state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan"; (2)
"Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO"; (3) "There will be no
change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with
the basic guidelines of the Government" of Israel, which reject Palestinian
self-determination in any meaningful form. The phrase "additional Palestinian
state" reflects the consensus view that there already is a Palestinian state,
namely, Jordan, so that the issue of self-determination for the Palestinians
does not arise, contrary to what Jordanians, Palestinians, and the rest of the
world mistakenly believe. The "Basic Premises" incorporate the "Four No's" of
the official Labor party program: No return to the 1967 borders, No removal of
settlements, No negotiations with the PLO, No Palestinian state. The coalition
plan then calls for a peace treaty with Jordan and "free and democratic
elections" under Israeli military occupation with the PLO excluded and much of
the Palestinian leadership interned without charges in Israeli prison camps.
The US quickly endorsed this forthcoming proposal. James Baker explained
that "Our goal all along has been to try to assist in the implementation of
the Shamir initiative. There is no other proposal or initiative that we are
working with." On December 6, 1989, the Department of State released the Baker
Plan, which spelled out five points for the "peace process," referring to an
Egypt-Israel-Palestinian "dialogue" in Cairo. The Baker Plan stipulated that
Israel would attend "only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been
worked out," and that any Palestinians allowed by the US and Israel to attend
would be restricted to discussion of implementation of the Shamir Plan.
Recall that all of this was long before the Gulf War, and while the US-PLO
"dialogue" was spinning along in its intentionally pointless way. Standard
doctrine on the exclusion of the PLO is utterly without merit, as mere
inspection of dates and documents clearly demonstrates -- for example, the
claim that Arafat lost his place at the table "as a result of his support for
Iraq in the gulf war" (Thomas Friedman), and that "the principal causes of the
PLO's weakness" today are PLO support for Saddam Hussein and failure to expel
the perpetrators of a thwarted terrorist action in May 1990, which led the US
to suspend the dialogue, no longer of any tactical utility (editorial,
Boston Globe). Even if we adopt the version of what happened put forth
by the propaganda system, it merely offers new pretexts for old policies,
always supported by the same organs prior to the alleged crimes. The
performance may be dismissed as childish, but given the guaranteed unanimity
of voices, it is effective.27
The Gulf conflict did, however, accelerate the US pursuit of its
rejectionist diplomacy, for reasons already discussed. That brings us to
Madrid. Here too some historical background is useful to interpret what is
happening, and to decode its portrayal.
The Evolution of US Policy
The Madrid conference and its aftermath are concerned with the situation
that arose in the wake of the June 1967 war, which left Israel in control of
Egypt's Sinai peninsula, the Syrian Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip
(administered by Egypt), and the West Bank (administered by Jordan, its status
unrecognized internationally). Other issues are not under consideration. To
mention only the most obvious, while the status of the West Bank is a topic of
debate, Israel's incorporation of the other half of the Palestinian state
proposed in the original UN partition resolution of 1947 is a settled issue.
Jordan's illegitimate occupation of the West Bank figures prominently in
US-Israeli propaganda; the fact that the Palestinian state was, in effect,
partitioned between Jordan and Israel, with no small amount of collusion, and
that Egypt fought in the 1948 war in part to counter the ambitions of
Britain's Jordanian client, is left to scholarly monographs.28
Another settled issue is that the conference is based on UN resolution 242,
adopted by the Security Council in November 1967. This resolution keeps to
inter-state relations, avoiding the Palestinian issue, and is therefore
acceptable to the US and Israel, as distinct from many other UN resolutions
dating back to December 1948 that endorse Palestinian rights of varying sorts
that the US does not acknowledge (though in some cases, the US voted for the
resolutions). UN 242 is also acceptable because of its ambiguity. Crucially
not settled is what the resolution means; it was left intentionally vague
to assure at least formal acceptance by the states of the region.
The resolution opens by "emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which
every State in the area can live in security." It calls for "withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,"
"termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries...."
With regard to the meaning of these provisions, two crucial questions
arise. First, what is the meaning of the phrase "from territories occupied"?
Second, what is to be the status of the indigenous population of the former
Palestine, the Palestinians, who are not a "State" and therefore do not fall
under the resolution?
Both questions reached the Security Council in January 1976, in the
resolution discussed earlier, incorporating the basic wording of UN 242 but
extending it to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The resolution
answered the first question by calling for a settlement on the Green Line. It
answered the second by calling for a Palestinian state in the territories from
which Israel would withdraw. As noted, it was vetoed by the United States,
effectively terminating any UN role in the peace process, apart from gestures.
Given US opposition, all such proposals, however vague, are off the agenda,
out of the historical record, not part of public discussion. The two basic
questions concerning UN 242 therefore remain unresolved. To be more precise,
they will be settled by force, that is, by the United States, in international
isolation. A different approach to the two questions left unsettled in UN 242
had been formulated by UN mediator Gunnar Jarring, who proposed a plan calling
for a full peace treaty on the Green Line. This proposal was accepted by
President Sadat of Egypt in February 1971. Israel recognized it as a genuine
peace offer, but rejected it; the Labor party was committed to broader
territorial gains from the 1967 war. Note that the Jarring-Sadat proposal
offered nothing to the Palestinians. The basic problem is not Palestinian
rights per se, but rather the fact that recognizing them would bar Israeli
control over the occupied territories.
At the insistence of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, the US
backed Israel's rejection of the Sadat offer, adopting Kissinger's policy of
"stalemate." As usual, the US decision to back Israel's rejection of the
Jarring-Sadat peace proposal removed the events from history and public
discussion, at least in the United States. In Israel, in contrast, even
conservative Middle East specialists recognize that Israel may have "missed a
historic opportunity" in 1971 (Itamar Rabinovitch, asking whether Israel also
missed such an opportunity when a Syrian proposal was rejected in 1949).29
The Jarring-Sadat proposal was virtually identical to official US policy,
formulated in the State Department plan of December 1969 (the Rogers Plan). It
also conformed to the general interpretation of UN 242 outside of Israel. The
Rogers plan suggests that this was also the US interpretation at the time, a
conclusion supported by other evidence. In an important article in a British
Middle East journal, Donald Neff, a well-known US journalist and historian
specializing on Middle East affairs, reviews a State Department study based on
records of the 1967 negotiations.30
This study, leaked to Neff, has been kept secret "so as not to embarrass
Israel," Neff concludes. The study quotes the chief American negotiator,
Arthur Goldberg, who was strongly pro-Israel. Goldberg informed King Hussein
of Jordan that the US "could not guarantee that everything would be returned
to Jordan; some territorial adjustments would be required," but there must be
"a mutuality in adjustments." Secretary of State Dean Rusk confirmed to
Hussein that the US "would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan
for any territory it was required to give up," citing examples. Goldberg
informed officials of other Arab states "that the United States did not
conceive of any substantial redrawing of the map." Israel's withdrawal would
be "total except for minor adjustments," Goldberg assured the Arabs, with
compensation to Jordan for any such adjustments. His assurances led them to
agree to UN 242. In a private communication to Neff, Dean Rusk recently
affirmed that "We never contemplated any significant grant of territory to
Israel as a result of the June 1967 war." The US interpretation of UN 242
contemplated "minor adjustments in the western frontier of the West Bank,"
"demilitarization measures in the Sinai and Golan Heights," and "a fresh look"
at the status of Jerusalem. "Resolution 242 never contemplated the movement of
any significant territories to Israel," Rusk concluded.
Advocates of Israeli policies in the United States commonly claim that this
interpretation of UN 242 is contrary to the stand taken by Arthur Goldberg and
the US government generally. Thus the news columns of the New York Times
inform us that the Israeli version of UN 242, which permits Israel to
incorporate unspecified parts of the conquered territories, is "supported by
Arthur J. Goldberg," citing later comments of his in which he did indeed
support the Israeli version.31
One of the more extreme apologists, Yale Law professor and former
government official Eugene Rostow, claims that he "helped produce" UN 242, and
has repeatedly argued that it authorizes continued Israeli control over the
territories. In response to his claims, David Korn, former State Department
office director for Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs, wrote in November 1991
that helped produce' Resolution 242, but in fact he had little if anything to
do with it." He was an "onlooker," like "many others who have claimed a hand
in it." "It was U.S. policy at the time and for several years afterward," Korn
continues, "that [any border] changes would be no more than minor." Korn
confirms that "Both Mr. Goldberg and Secretary of State Dean Rusk told King
Hussein that the United States would use its influence to obtain territorial
compensation from Israel for any West Bank lands ceded by Jordan to Israel,"
and that Jordan's acquiescence was based on these promises. Rostow's pathetic
and evasive response contests none of these statements.32
The available evidence leads us to conclude that the US kept to the
international consensus until February 1971, when it rejected the
Jarring-Sadat initiative. US isolation increased in the mid-1970s as the
international consensus shifted to recognition of a Palestinian right of
self-determination. Since February 1971, the US has been essentially alone in
blocking the "peace process." The standard version here is quite different, of
course.
Kissinger's support for Israeli intransigence led directly to the 1973 war.
Sadat's repeated warnings that he would go to war if the US and Israel
continued to block any diplomatic initiatives were dismissed during this
period of extreme US-Israeli triumphalism, on the assumption that Israel's
power was overwhelming and "war is not the Arab's game," as explained by
Israeli Arabist and director of military intelligence General Yehoshaphat
Harkabi (now a dove), in a statement less extreme than many. General Ariel
Sharon's ravings were particularly noteworthy.33
On the same assumptions, the US rebuffed Sadat's offers to drop Soviet
patronage and transform Egypt to a US client state.
The 1973 war shattered these illusions. It turned out to be a near thing,
and Henry Kissinger, no great genius but able to recognize the mailed fist,
realized that policy must shift. The US then turned to the natural fall-back
position. Since Egypt could not simply be dismissed as a basket case, the
obvious strategy was to accept it as a US client state and remove it from the
conflict. This was the goal of Kissinger's "step-by-step" diplomacy, a process
accelerated by Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem and finally consummated at Camp
David, over the strong objections of leading elements of the (by then,
opposition) Labor party, because the treaty required that Israel abandon the
northeastern Sinai settlements that Labor had established.
The import of the Camp David settlement was obvious at once. With the major
Arab deterrent removed from the conflict and a huge increase in US aid, Israel
would be free to accelerate its takeover of the occupied territories and to
invade Lebanon, which it had subjected to devastating bombardment and
occasional terrorist attack for years, as part of its interaction with the PLO
in southern Lebanon. In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon, killing several thousand
people, driving out hundreds of thousands more, and placing the southern zone
under the rule of a murderous client force. Israel still remains in defiance
of UN Security Council resolution 425 (March 1978) ordering it to withdraw
from Lebanon unconditionally and immediately. In 1982 Israel invaded again
after a year of Israeli terror attacks intended (in vain) to elicit some PLO
response that would serve as a pretext for its plan to destroy the PLO as a
political force, thus ensuring Israeli control over the occupied territories
while placing Lebanon under Israeli suzerainty. The 1982 invasion was far more
devastating, with over 20,000 killed, mostly civilians. Integration of the
occupied territories meanwhile continued apace.
The obvious import of Camp David is by now sometimes acknowledged, in
Israel, quite frankly. Israeli strategic analyst Avner Yaniv writes that the
effect of the Camp David agreement, removing Egypt from the conflict, was that
"Israel would be free to sustain military operations against the PLO in
Lebanon as well as settlement activity on the West Bank." Expressing a
widely-held consensus among Israeli experts and political figures, he adds
that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was intended to "undermine the position of
the moderates within [the peace offensive' " and "to halt [the PLO's] rise to
political respectability." It should be called "the war to safeguard the
occupation of the West Bank," General Harkabi observes, having been motivated
by Begin's "fear of the momentum of the peace process." The US backed the
Israeli invasion, presumably for the same reasons, well-known at the time,
unless we are willing to attribute to US intelligence and planners an
extraordinary level of ignorance and stupidity.34
The Camp David accords offered the Palestinians limited "autonomy" under
Israeli rule for an interim period. Israel and Egypt agreed on specifics by
1980, according to US mediator Sol Linowitz, who regards the Palestinian
rejection of this offer as a tragic error on their part, noting accurately
that the 1980 proposal is the most they can expect from the US and Israel
today. Palestinians rejected it at the time, Linowitz notes, on the grounds
that it would preclude authentic self-government in an independent state, and
they also objected to the exclusion of their political representatives, the
PLO, a stand that Linowitz regards as completely unreasonable -- for
Palestinians, not Jews. Reporting Linowitz's views, New York Times
correspondent Sabra Chatrand adds that Likud Prime Minister Menahem Begin
favored the autonomy proposal "because the idea seemed to resolve the
Palestinian issue while leaving Israel in fundamental control of West Bank and
Gaza" -- precisely the point at the time, and still today.
Neither Chatrand nor Linowitz see any merit in the Palestinian
unwillingness to "leave Israel in fundamental control of West Bank and Gaza."
On the rejectionist assumptions that are an entry ticket to polite society in
the United States, Palestinian unhappiness with such an outcome merely reveals
that Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, in a
standard formula. The racist undertones also provide more than a little
insight into the prevailing intellectual culture here. Particularly noteworthy
is the praise lavished upon Palestinian negotiators who don't simply hang from
trees and brandish submachine guns but speak "poetically" (as Thomas Friedman
puts it) and "pragmatically," adapting to US terms while deferring their
"unrealistic" demands for the rights granted as a matter of course to the
Jewish immigrants who displaced them -- not that they have much of a choice,
given the monopoly of violence in the hands of the United States and its
Israeli client, and the monolithic system for transforming the real world into
images suitable for the needs of domestic power.
Chatrand observes further that "after years of conflict with Israel,
uncounted deaths, and even more hardship, Palestinians have abandoned their
earlier conditions" -- not the first demonstration of what John Quincy Adams
called the "salutary efficacy" of terror. Observing the conventions, Chatrand
also reports that the United States, a helpless victim as always, "tried and
failed to get Israel to stop building Jewish settlements in the occupied
territories," while vastly increasing US aid for their construction.35
It could be argued that the Palestinians should have accepted the proposal
that left Israel "in fundamental control" of the occupied territories, but it
is unlikely that the outcome would have been any different. Those with the
guns and the money determine the meaning of the words, and there is little
reason to suppose that the US would have chosen not to lend its decisive and
active support to Israel's expansion into the territories and attacks on
Lebanon had Palestinians agreed to accept Israeli-run "autonomy."
Sadat's 1977 peace initiative was less acceptable from the US-Israeli
perspective than his 1971 proposal, because it called for Palestinian
self-determination, in accord with the changing international consensus.
Nevertheless, Sadat is hailed as one of the grand figures of the modern age
for his 1977 efforts, while the 1971 proposal has been removed from history.
The reasons are those just reviewed. In 1971, the US backed Israel's rejection
of his peace proposal, though it offered nothing to the Palestinians and
scarcely deviated from official US policy. Such facts are politically
incorrect, therefore banned from history by the guardians of Truth. By 1977,
US policy had shifted for the reasons noted, and the US had accepted Egypt as
a client state within its regional system. Though of course the US dismissed
at once the terms that Sadat proposed in Jerusalem, it could proceed with its
own rejectionist project, with Sadat playing his assigned role, therefore
achieving heroic stature. As always, history is established by the powerful.
The Camp David agreement is regarded in the US as a great triumph of US
diplomacy, and the model for what should come next. That too is
understandable, given the actual record.
The Prospects
Let us return finally to the three original questions: What is the reason
for the timing of the Bush-Baker initiative? Does it signify a departure from
the traditional US stand? What is the meaning of the conflicts between the US
and Israel?
The most plausible answers seem to be that the initiative is badly needed
for domestic and regional political reasons, but otherwise simply extends
traditional US goals. The conflicts with Israel remain focussed on the issues
that have always been in dispute: the modalities of rejectionism.
The underlying US government thinking has been discussed before in these
pages. To review briefly, US diplomacy is guided by a strategic conception
that has changed very little over the years. The primary concern is the energy
resources of the region, which are to be managed by the "Arab Facade," under
the effective control of the US and its British ally. The family dictatorships
must be protected from indigenous nationalism by regional enforcers: Turkey,
Israel, Iran (under the Shah), Pakistan, etc., the "periphery pact" of
Ben-Gurion's hopes and strategy. U.S.-British force lies in reserve. Regional
actors are granted rights insofar as they contribute to "stability," a term of
art referring to the establishment and enforcement of this system. The Gulf
tyrannies naturally have rights, as did Saddam Hussein before he committed the
crime of disobedience, the only one that matters, on August 2, 1990. Israel
has been regarded as a major component of this system from the 1960s. It has
also served US interests worldwide, carrying out tasks that the US had to
delegate to others because of domestic opposition or for other reasons, and
cooperating in intelligence matters and weapons production and testing. The
Palestinians, in contrast, offer neither wealth nor power. Accordingly, they
have no rights, by the most elementary principles of statecraft.
The US stance can be traced back to 1948, when the Pentagon, impressed by
Israel's victories, recognized it to be the major regional power after Turkey
and a potential base for US power. As for the Palestinians, US planners had no
reason to question the assessment of Israeli government specialists that the
Palestinian refugees "would be crushed": "some of them would die and most of
them would turn into human dust and the waste of society, and join the most
impoverished classes in the Arab countries." As noted, this was the
traditional position of liberal Zionism, and the wording is repeated by such
Labor party leaders as Yitzhak Rabin until today. On these assumptions, there
has been no need for any concern over the fate of the indigenous population of
the former Palestine.
The operative principles were well expressed by New Republic
editor Martin Peretz, one of the more extreme anti-Arab racists and apologists
for Israeli atrocities, just before Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, when he
advised Israel to administer to the PLO a "lasting military defeat" that "will
clarify to the Palestinians in the West Bank that their struggle for an
independent state has suffered a setback of many years," the essential purpose
of the invasion. Then "the Palestinians will be turned into just another
crushed nation, like the Kurds or the Afghans," and the Palestinian problem --
which "is beginning to be boring" -- will be resolved.36
His timing may have been off, but basic principles are resilient in states
with unchallenged power. Peretz's attitude towards the Kurds also captures US
policy succinctly, as we have recently seen once again.
Control over Middle East energy resources provides important leverage in
world affairs and guarantees a badly needed flow of capital to the economies
of the United States and Britain. The system of regional management has
changed in detail, but the operative principles have not. The course of
diplomacy is understandable in these terms.
From the US perspective, a preferred outcome of the current diplomatic
maneuvers would be: First, an "interim agreement" between Israel and the
Palestinians, which would enable Israel to extend its control over the
territories within the framework of Labor Party rejectionism; Second, steps
toward commercial and diplomatic relations between Israel and the Gulf rulers,
thus extending and making somewhat more overt the tacit alliance of the past
several decades; Third, arrangements for the Golan Heights that would ensure
Israeli control of the crucial water resources while satisfying Syrian
nationalist goals, at least symbolically. If the US rejectionist program is
not advanced in these ways, the US will easily win a valuable propaganda
victory by placing the blame on Middle East fanatics who have disrupted
Washington's noble intentions. It is reasonable to expect that the policies of
the past years will then be pursued in other ways.
If US interests are reassessed and Washington decides to press Israel
beyond what its leadership would accept, Israel does have certain options,
despite its extreme dependency on the United States. The nature of these
options has been the topic of considerable discussion within Israel. Writing
about the matter almost 10 years ago, I quoted Aryeh (Lova) Eliav, one of
Israel's best-known doves, who deplored the attitude of "those who brought
Samson complex' here, according to which we shall kill and bury all the
Gentiles around us while we ourselves shall die with them." Others too
regarded the greatest danger facing Israel as the "collective version" of
Samson's revenge against the Philistines, recalling Prime Minister Moshe
Sharett's diary entries from the 1950s, in which he recorded the "preaching"
of high-level Labor party officials "in favor of acts of madness" and "the
diabolical lesson of how to set the Middle East on fire" with "acts of despair
and suicide" that will terrify the world as "we go crazy," if crossed.
Israel's nuclear power, well-known to US authorities for many years, renders
such thinking more than empty threats. Writing in 1982, three Israeli
strategic analysts observed that Israel's nuclear capacity included missiles
able to reach "many targets in southern USSR," a threat -- real or pretended
-- that may well be aimed primarily at the United States, putting US planners
on notice that pressures on Israel to accede to an unwanted political
settlement could lead to an international conflagration. The reasoning was
explained further in the Labor party journal Davar, reporting
Israel's reaction to the Saudi peace plan of August 1981, with the "signs of
open-mindedness and moderation" that the government of Israel regarded as a
serious threat. Israel's response was to send military jets over the oil
fields, a warning to the West of Israel's capacity to cause immense
destruction to the world's major energy reserves if pressed towards an
unwanted peace, Davar reported.37
The world has changed since, but Israel's "Samson option," as Seymour Hersh
calls it in a recent book, remains alive.
Serious Israeli analysts today express considerable concern over what may
lie ahead. One of Israel's leading military commentators, Lieutenant-Colonel
Ron Ben-Yishai, was interviewed recently on the Bush-Baker initiatives. "This
might be the last chance we have to make peace," he said. He expected the
current diplomatic efforts to fail. This failure will lead to a war, which
should last "a minimum of three to four weeks," a "conventional war" with some
surface-to-surface missiles but mostly a ground war, with uncertain prospects
and surely grim consequences.38
There has been a rash of similar predictions, referring to a war with Syria
that Israel might initiate with a preemptive strike. The US will surely do
what it can to prevent that, but even US power reaches only so far. If the US
keeps to its rejectionist stand, Israel will continue to integrate the
territories, the core local conflict will remain unresolved, turbulence and
antagonisms will fester and intermittently explode, and a stable regional
settlement -- let alone a just one -- is most unlikely.
Notes
1 Friedman, NYT, July 7; R. W. Apple,
NYT, Oct. 30, 1991.
2 Yotam Navin, Yediot Ahronot, Oct. 1,
1991; see my article in Z magazine, October 1991.
3 Editorial, Ha'aretz, Sept. 2; Yossi
Sarid, Yediot Ahronot, Sept. 15; Nahum Barnea, Yediot
Ahronot, Sept. 13; Jackson Diehl, Washington Post -- Manchester
Guardian Weekly, Sept. 29; Clyde Haberman, NYT, Sept. 21,
1991. See also Ehud Sprinzak, WP Weekly, Sept. 23, 1991.
4 Sever Plotzker, Yediot Ahronot, Aug.
25, 1991.
5 Friedman, Yediot Ahronot, April 7,
1988; Hotam, April 15, 1988. Shlomo Frankel, Al-Hamishmar,
July 14, 1991.
6 Mary Kay Magistad, Boston Globe, Oct.
20, 1991.
7 BG, Oct. 20, 1991.
8 Friedman, NYT, Nov. 4, 1991. On
Friedman's intriguing record, see my
Necessary Illusions (South End, 1989), particularly
appendix 5, sec. 4.
9 Haberman, NYT, Nov. 10; Rubinstein,
Ha'aretz, Oct. 24, 1991.
10 Lewis, NYT, Nov. 8, 1991.
11 Lewis, NYT, Oct. 21, 1991; Apple,
NYT Week in Review, Sept. 22, 1991.
12 Clyde Haberman, "Israel Jails Abie Nathan for New
Arafat Contact," NYT, Oct. 7, 1991. A few days later, another
Israeli peace activist, David Ish-Shalom, was sentenced under the same law for
discussions with the PLO on bringing back people whom Israel had (illegally)
deported from the occupied territories.
13 Negbi, Hadashot, Sept. 13, 1991.
14 Reuters, Toronto Globe and Mail,
Sept. 5, 1991. On Shamir's thoughts and actions in the 1940s, see my article
in Alexander George, Western State Terrorism (Polity press,
London, 1991).
15 Lewis, op. cit.
16 See my Deterring Democracy (Verso,
1991), 29.
17 Ron Ben-Yishai, interview with Arens,
Yediot Ahronot, Sept. 17, 1991.
18 Peter Waldman, WSJ, May 10, 1991.
19 Peter Waldman, Wall St. Journal,
Oct. ??, 1991.
20 Kapeliouk, Israel: la fin des mythes
(Albin Michel, 1975), 21, 29, 220. This important study, a translation from
the original Hebrew, could find no American publisher. Shabtai Teveth,
Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs (Oxford, 1985), 187f., and Benny
Morris, review of Teveth, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 11, 1985; Teveth
is the highly sympathetic biographer of Ben-Gurion. See also my Fateful
Triangle (South End, 1983), 161f. Weizmann, Yosef Heller,
Bama'avak Lamdina (The Struggle for the State: Zionist Diplomacy
of the years 1936-48, Jerusalem 1985), Jewish Agency protocols; Yosef
Gorny, Zionism and the Arabs (Oxford, 1985), 110.
21 Flora Lewis, NYT, Nov. 2, 1991.
22 Beilin, Mehiro shel Ihud, Revivim,
1985.
23 Kapeliouk, op. cit., 282,
retranslated from French.
24 Gazit, Hamakel Vehagezer (Tel Aviv,
1985), quoted in Al Hamishmar, Nov. 7, 1985.
25 For an ongoing account and references, see my
articles in Z magazine, March 1989, Jan. 1990, and
Necessary Illusions.
26 Israeli Government Election Plan, Jerusalem, 14
May 1989, official text distributed by the Embassy of Israel in Washington.
27 Baker, Thomas Friedman, NYT, Oct.
19, 1989; Baker Plan, U.S. Department of State press release, Dec 6, 1989.
Friedman, NYT, Nov. 4; BG, Oct. 6, 1991.
28 See particularly Avi Shlaim, Collusion over
Jordan (Columbia, 1988). Also Rabinovitch, The Road Not Taken
(Oxford, 1991), 171.
29 Rabinovitch, op. cit., 108.
30 Noring and Smith, The Withdrawal Clause in
UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, Feb. 1978; Neff,
Middle East International, 13 Sept. 1991.
31 Sabra Chatrand, "The The' that Brought Mideast
Rivals to Table," NYT, Oct. 29, 1991.
32 Rostow, Korn, New Republic, Oct. 21,
Nov. 18, , Nov. 25, 1991.
33 Kapeliouk, op. cit., 281. See my
Peace in the Middle East? (Pantheon, 1974), chap. 4.
34 For these and references, see
Necessary Illusions, 174f., 276. For discussion at the time
and immediately after, see Fateful Triangle and my Pirates
and Emperors (Claremont, 1986; Amana, 1988).
35 Chartrand, NYT, Nov. 5, 1991.
36 Interview in Ha'aretz, June 4, 1982;
see Fateful Triangle, 199. On the racist effusions of Peretz and
others, see
Necessary Illusions, 315.
37 See my Fateful Triangle (South End,
1983), 464ff.
38 "Elazar," Jerusalem Post Magazine.
Oct. 4, 1991.